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The persona of the smuggler looms large in current nar-
ratives of migration worldwide. He—for   the smuggler 
has been gendered as male – tends to be depicted as 
responsible for what has repeatedly been labelled 
as the European migration crisis; for the deaths of 
migrants in places as dissimilar as the Mediterranean, 
the Sahara, the Darien and the US-Mexico deserts and 
borderlands; and for the exploitation and suffering of 
migrant women and children. Smugglers are, in short, 
the masterminds behind the collapse of the efforts of 
governments to control irregular migration.
And yet, as many scholars have argued, the dominance 
of law enforcement perspectives in the definition and 
treatment of irregular migration facilitation practices 
has increasingly obscured the identities and experi-
ences of the people whose efforts allow for the mobility 
of thousands of migrants around the world. And so 
a question emerges:  who are those hidden by the 
smuggler label?
In this short collection of essays, a diverse group of 
scholars and practitioners sheds light on the expe-
riences of actors widely spoken of but hardly ever 
included in the conversations around smuggling fa-
cilitation. These contributions challenge the mono-
lithic perceptions of smuggling as merely exploitative, 
inherently criminal, violent and male, by document-
ing the experiences of the men, women and children 
whose actions facilitate migration along some of the 
most transited migration corridors worldwide. Hans 
Lucht narrates the devastating impacts that EU-driven 
control and confinement have had on Ghanaian 
migration brokers, known locally as connection men, 
and their communities. Kyunghee Kook describes the 
risks faced by the smugglers who facilitate the journeys 
of North Korean escapees.  The authors demonstrate 
that those who facilitate migration processes are not 
exempt from stigma, criminalization, detention and 
violence, and are in fact often migrants themselves 
attempting to reach a destination, or residents along 
the migration pathway whose own possibilities of 
mobility are minimal at best. Wayne Palmer and Antje 
Missbach’s work examines the legal processes against 
young Indonesian men who participate in smuggling, 
while DHIA shares the findings of its study on the US 
detention practices involving circuit children, the boys 
and girls from the US Mexico border who are force-
fully separated from their families as a result of their 
involvement in smuggling. Luigi Achilli also writes 
about children, providing an overview of the mecha-
nisms that are developed for their specific protection 
in the context of smuggling journeys. 
The authors are also cognizant of how irregular 
migration has given rise to specific forms of  crime and 
violence. Stephanie Leutert and Caitlyn Yates write 
about migrant kidnapping in Mexico, while Conor 
O’Reilly outlines the challenges to conceptualizing and 
studying the same practice in the context of mobility. 
Tekalign Ayalew  discusses abductions and the widely 
circulated representations of migrant ‘slavery’ in the 
African migration context. All the authors emphasize 
that violence targeting migrants in transit does not 
occur in a vacuum, having a strong connection to 
migration enforcement and controls, urging us as 
readers to reflect of how representations of migration 
are also shaped by colonial pasts and imaginaries and 
their long-lasting violent implications.
 Along those lines, while Libya has been at the centre 
of the EU’s focus, knowledge of its actors is still limited 
to orientalist narratives of barbaric militias and tribes. 
Mark Micallef historicizes the processes that gave rise 
to the now challenging smuggling landscape in the 
country, while Alessandro Tinti examines the claims 
that have linked foreign fighters to migrant smuggling 
groups. 
Paolo Campana and Gabriella Sanchez’s research 
challenges the dominant claim that smuggling is 
the domain of complex and hierarchical networks. 
Campana focuses on the Europe-bound smuggling 
market, while Sanchez describes the experiences of 
women prosecuted for smuggling in the United States, 
with similar conclusions. Both identify smuggling 
markets as having low barriers to participation, which 
allows for the participation of multiple actors, while 
also making these largely disposable. Sanchez also 
outlines the gendered impacts of smuggling criminali-
zation, and the consequences of counter-smuggling 
operations on the children of women charged with the 
offense.
Sheldon Zhang closes this collection by posing a con-
cluding question: can we dare to think the impossi-
ble? Are rational and realistic policies that focus on 
harm reduction while protecting the dignity of those 
traveling on the migration pathway worldwide –and 
those behind their journeys –a  dream? Is a world 
without mobility restrictions possible or, in fact, 
merely unavoidable? We invite you to join the discus-
sion, and to contribute to a much-delayed dialogue on 
the futures of mobility. 





THE CASE OF 
CHILDREN
Luigi Achilli – Global Governance Programme, 
European University Institute
Introduction
According to 2017 data, the number of unaccompa-
nied and separated migrant children has increased 
five times over the past six years on a global scale. In 
the European case in 2017 alone, authorities regis-
tered the arrival of 33,000 in Greece, Italy, Spain, and 
Bulgaria, fleeing severe economic distress, political 
unrest, and warfare. Although this constitutes a clear 
decrease compared to 2016 (100,264), the percentage 
of unaccompanied or separated children (UASC) has 
increased by 31 percent (UNICEF 2019). It Is estimated 
that approximately four minors in every five (86 per 
cent) arriving in Italy and Spain were UASC (ibid).
Despite the growing visibility of this phenom-
enon, scant research has been conducted on chil-
dren’s migration patterns and/or their interactions 
with smuggling networks. The present contribution 
provides insights into minors’ trajectories and their 
communications with smugglers and in so doing seeks 
to contribute to developing effective policy practices 
to prevent the exploitation of children on the move. 
This, however, demands an acknowledgement that the 
smuggling of children is often a desperate attempt to 
protect them on the part of the adults who care for 
them. In that sense, it is also fundamental to under-
stand that smuggling practices are often grounded in 
community-based notions of cooperation and support 
(Achilli, 2018, Vogt 2018). When minors’ exploita-
tion occurs, this is more often the consequence of a 
protracted condition of deprivation and irregularity, 
emerging from their lack of recognized status, than it 
is a product of the criminal intent of mafia-like organi-
zations.  
This contribution is based on research on human 
smuggling conducted along the Eastern Mediterranean 
corridor between 2015 and 2017 among migrants and 
smugglers of different ethnic backgrounds (Achilli, 
2018). It also draws from work conducted between 
January and May 2017 in Lebanon, Greece, and Jordan 
among children, local authorities and other stake-
holders on children’s migrations (Achilli et al. 2017).
Whose “best Interest”?
Children’s reliance on smuggling networks to cover 
legs of their journeys might be surprising. By virtue of 
their age, minors should be entitled to special forms of 
protection; especially if we consider that most – if not 
all – the countries they transit through have ratified the 
1989 Convention for the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
While lacking specific references to migration, the CRC 
provides specific guidelines concerning the protection 
of children. Article 3 of the convention states: “In all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of 
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the 
best interests of the child shall be a primary considera-
tion.” In September 2016, the member states of the UN 
reaffirmed their commitment to addressing the specific 
needs of children travelling as part of large movements 
of refugees and migrants, especially children who are 
unaccompanied or separated from their families, in 
the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.
However, the experience of children on the move as 
part of the most recent migratory waves in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the actions carried out on their 
behalf by the states raise concerns over whose best 
interests are the ones being protected. In Greece, the 
prevailing tendency among authorities and the in-
ternational community to enact “appropriate care 
provision” for minors on the move by endorsing the 
use of protective custody has led at times to the dis-
ruption of social relationships and the exacerbation 
of children’s vulnerability (Achilli et al. 2017). Most 
disturbingly, data collected in mid-2017 in Jordan 
confirmed that minors are particularly vulnerable to 
being forcibly relocated to detention centers in refugee 
camps. Children found to be working without regular 
permits are often separated from their families and 
relocated to detention centers in refugee camps. As a 
result, nuclear families are frequently broken apart and 
children become separated from their parents, despite 
living in the same country.
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Smuggling, border control, 
and exploitation: when 
smuggling goes wrong 
The abuses and deception suffered by smuggled minors 
and other vulnerable groups in the context of their 
journeys have provided the basis for the emergence of 
mechanisms of protection within migrant communi-
ties (Achilli, 2018; Sanchez, 2016). In this sense, the es-
tablishment of ethnic-based smuggling networks along 
the Western Mediterranean route seeks to provide 
assisted if precarious crossing services for migrants. 
These networks should in theory constitute a “chain of 
trust” (Van Liempt, 2007: 171), a concept that assumes 
the existence of ethnic ties between smugglers and 
migrants as likely to prevent abuses.  
Among this study’s informants – mostly migrants 
from Arabic speaking countries – smuggling was not 
just about profiting because the smuggler (muharrib) 
was not necessarily driven only by material gain. The 
practice of smuggling involved smugglers restrict-
ing their margin of profit, using good-quality boats, 
and treating their customers with dignity. In the case 
of minors on the move, informants reported that 
smugglers are often chosen by virtue of their reputa-
tion as trusted and reliable guardians who care for the 
needs of the children and protect them against the risks 
present in the journey, while escorting them to their 
destination or the next stop toward their destination. 
Any conduct deviating from these standards of service 
would be considered reprehensible and even immoral.
More often than smugglers’ individual actions, the 
establishment and enforcement of border controls 
and the reduction of channels for legal entry increase 
migrant minors’ likelihood of being abused and 
exploited, even if traveling within groups with whom 
they share kinship and ethnic ties. Syrian minors for 
example reported that the inability to overcome border 
controls or to complete stages of their journeys had led 
them to accept work along the route under dangerous 
and exploitative conditions, or even to join smuggling 
networks to work off their fees (Achilli, 2018; Achilli et 
al. 2017; see also ICMPD, 2015).
The journey
While media reports blame trafficking organizations 
for the disappearance of refugee children, no less dis-
turbing reasons may be behind this trend.  The reliance 
on protective custody and the increasing tightening of 
border controls along the Eastern Mediterranean route 
have encouraged many unaccompanied and separated 
children to avoid the child protection system altogeth-
er. In Greece, for example, 20 percent of unaccompa-
nied minors disappear from reception centers within 
24 hours of their placement there (Fili, 2014). The dis-
appearance can be explained as the result of many of 
the children opting to travel, with the support of their 
families or on their own, with smuggling networks.
Minors travelling irregularly to Europe along the 
Eastern Mediterranean route seem to use the same 
channels as all other irregular migrants. The predomi-
nant route is from Turkey to the Greek islands by boat 
or, with increasing frequency these days, over the 
land border between Turkey and Greece. Migration 
trajectories from Greece onward depend on a variety 
of factors that are far from linear. Taken together, 
ethnicity, country of origin, time of the year, and es-
pecially the fast-changing scenarios of border controls 
make minors’ journeys complex (Achilli et al. 2017; 
REACH 2017).  
In 2015, for example, almost a million irregular 
migrants arrived in Europe – many of them  minors 
– following the Western Balkan route. This trend was 
in part explained by the decision by a few Western 
Balkan countries to issue temporary transit documents 
for asylum seekers and migrants crossing their terri-
tories. The situation changed starting in early 2016. 
The decision of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia to seal its border with Greece in February 
and the EU-Turkey agreement signed on March 20th 
of that same year considerably stemmed the flow of 
people through the Balkan route. It also led to the 
mushrooming of smuggling groups operating in the 
region, and increased the dangers faced by migrants 
(e.g., prolonged detention, arbitrary beatings, arrests, 
deportations, forceful separations, longer and more 
dangerous migration routes, etc.).
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Policy implications
Empirical evidence collected among minors on the 
move along the Eastern Mediterranean corridor shows 
that smuggling networks are deeply enmeshed within 
migratory flows and in community practices of human 
security. Therefore, the eradication of smuggling or-
ganizations without addressing the causes leading to 
migration may prove difficult, if not impossible. Fur-
thermore, one of the main conclusions of our study was 
that what is often framed as exploitation by protection 
agencies often constitutes conscious and willing acts 
on the part of “victims” to facilitate their own mobility 
and improve their quality of life. In this context, more 
stringent border policies and practices are doomed to 
fail young people on the move: they simply bolster the 
very phenomena – human smuggling and trafficking – 
they are intended to fight.
Elsewhere, scholars have argued how a truly effective 
answer to human smuggling would require the EU 
and its state members to concentrate on reducing 
“demand” for smuggling services more than curbing 
“supply.” (Achilli, 2015, 2018; see also Mandic and 
Simpson, 2017). Accordingly, the first step to help 
strengthen protection policies for children on the 
move is the opening of new channels of legal entry and 
the reinforcement of already existing ones for asylum 
seekers—presumably the largest group of people 
smuggled by sea in Europe. This would translate into 
the granting of humanitarian visas; the creation of hu-
manitarian corridors between transit countries and 
Europe; the expansion of European countries’ reset-
tlement programmes; and the development of alterna-
tive legal routes for migrants and refugees – such as 
family reunification, university fellowships and schol-
arships, training programmes, private sponsorships, 
and labour mobility.1
1  For a complete set of recommendations on the three 
countries where this research was carried out, see Achilli et al. 
(2017).
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ransom, or engaging them in labour or sexual exploi-
tation systems. 
Several international organizations have reported the 
human right violations of migrants in Libya  –a fact 
existing prior to the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. The 
political crisis after the removal of Gaddafi, however, 
created further security vacuums (see Micallef, this 
issue) and led to the emergence of various types of 
criminal actors who engage in a vast range of abuses 
which often target migrants (Frouws et al. 2014a; 
Belloni 2015). On occasion, references to the existence 
of slave markets have been made, although these state-
ments have yet to be contextualized. The circulation of 
a video by CNN in 2017 portraying an alleged auction 
was, for example, problematic and sensationalistic. 
Migrants frequently use the words ‘selling’ and ‘buying’ 
to describe a complex range of interactions that take 
place among criminal and state actors at their expense, 
and which have become common practice in the 
context of Libya. The propensity to be ‘sold’ or ‘bought’ 
varies according to the migrant’s individual profile, 
and should not be understood as carrying the trans-
actional value as the CNN characterization sought to 
portray. Gender, religion and access to finances in the 
diaspora or countries of origin play a role in the like-
lihood of migrants to be kidnapped for ransom and/
or imprisoned. But these are also factors that allow 
migrants to be better positioned to access services from 
well-organized criminal actors who sell their ‘rescue’ 
services and/or who can arrange for improved condi-
tions during migrants’ precarious journeys, including 
sea crossings.  
This essay discusses the emergence and role of irregular 
migration facilitating infrastructures that support 
and sustain East African migratory mobility towards 
Europe. It is based on the argument that smuggling 
constitutes a social practice. Yet is also explores what 
happens when smuggling journeys go wrong, espe-
cially in reference to the impacts on migrants’ safety. 
Lastly, it identifies research gaps and policy implica-
tions.
Social organization of human 
smuggling
Hierarchically organized criminal groups are not 
behind the facilitation of smuggling along the Horn 
of Africa routes. Instead, migrants make discon-
nected, non-continuous journeys supported by small 
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Introduction
In the face of desperate socioeconomic and political 
conditions in origin and transit lands and the limited 
availability of paths for legal migration, young 
male and female migrants from the Horn of Africa 
(Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia) travel irregularly along 
dangerous and long trails and across deserts and seas. 
In this context and since the year 2000, Libya has been 
both a destination and a transition node for Horn of 
Africa migrants who use the north-western migration 
routes towards Europe via the Sudan, the Eastern 
Sahara, Libya and the Mediterranean Sea (Ayalew, 
2017). 
The mobility of migrants is facilitated by their inter-
actions with multiple actors:  family members in their 
homelands, migrants en-route and in the diaspora, 
local people along the trails, and smugglers known 
in local parlance as delaloch or semsaris (in Arabic). 
In contrast to dominant narratives of irregular 
migration, the service of smuggling is not offered by 
networked criminal organizations. It is embedded in 
and functions through particular transnational social 
relations. Shared nationality, ethnicity and religion 
among migrants and smugglers generate the necessary 
resources and knowhow. However, various types of 
criminal and state actor also engage in predatory 
activity along these trails, kidnapping migrants for 
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Despite all preparations and attempts to anticipate 
dangers, the journey is still risky and unpredict-
able given the obstacles migrants encounter along 
the route. All migrants are in a precarious position 
but their levels of vulnerability vary by virtue of age, 
gender, ethnicity and class. For instance, the physi-
cally fragile (such as those with health impairments, 
older people and children) face higher physical chal-
lenges due to exposure to the desert environment. 
Men are often the target of physical violence, while 
women are more likely to be subjected to kidnapping 
and sexual violence. However, people with access to 
financial resources – which often implies having access 
to remittances from abroad –have improved chances of 
escaping both violence and exposure by bribing guards 
and paying fees to criminal actors.  
Libya and Sudan lack the capacity to properly receive 
and provide support to the Horn of Africa migrants 
and refugees entering their territories. Acts of dis-
crimination and exploitation of migrants by virtue of 
their origin are perpetrated by criminal and officials 
actors alike, and appear to have become commonplace, 
especially in Libyan territory. Sub-Saharan African 
migrants in particular are stereotyped as ‘carriers of 
diseases’, ‘criminals’, ‘threats to national security’, or 
‘supporters or mercenaries of the Gaddafi regime,’ 
while Christian migrants are seen as unfit to under-
stand Islamic values (see also Reitano, 2015). Irregular 
migrants and refugees are collectively perceived in 
Sudan and Libya as ‘impure’, ‘polluting’ and ‘dangerous’ 
and become marginalized as a result of not fitting into 
the ‘national order of things’ (Malkki, 1995: 4-17). 
 While troubling, the violence migrants encounter 
en-route in the desert and inside Libya’s towns and 
cities, does not merely involve greedy smugglers com-
mitting crimes against the state and migrants depicted 
in the media (Gerard, 2014). There is in fact a broader 
context of structural violence in place: the EU has 
insisted on enforcing its borders and has signed agree-
ments with African transit countries to intercept 
incoming refuges in exchange for aid. There are also un-
confirmed allegations that the Italian government has 
signed agreements with militias and criminal factions, 
although this has not been confirmed. Together these 
have in turn made clandestine mobility more risky and 
costly. 
Migrants’ testimonies indicate that multiple criminal 
actors have emerged. Armed gangs and robbers kidnap 
and loosely organized operators and brokers offering 
specific smuggling-related services at particular transit 
points. The smugglers are not necessarily fulltime pro-
fessionals. Rather they are ordinary individuals such as 
lorry or taxi drivers, shepherds along border areas and 
former migrants settled along migrations routes. They 
engage in smuggling tasks to transport migrants and 
refugees towards specific destinations, often collabo-
rating with bought-out state officials or border guards.
In the Horn of Africa, smugglers –known in local 
parlance as delaloch or semsaris (in Arabic) –offer to 
guide migrants and refugees along safe routes towards 
Ethiopian and Sudanese borders, provide transporta-
tion services to cross borders, deserts and seas, and 
secure temporary jobs and safe houses in transit lands 
such as the Sudan and Libya. For these reasons, migrants 
and refugees often define the actions of smugglers as a 
form of brokerage, rather than as crimes.  
The communication and interactions migrants and 
refugees establish and maintain with family members 
in their homeland, former migrants en-route and 
in the diaspora, and local people along the trails 
generate a body of collective knowledge about routes, 
smugglers, and timing. This knowledge is intended to 
communicate to the traveller how to behave during 
interactions with smugglers; where to hide money; 
which clothes, medicine and food to carry, and even 
ways to avoid and survive violence. Mobility itself 
also leads to the emergence of intimate relations and 
emotional attachments among fellow travellers, the 
ones left behind, those en route and in the diaspora. In 
sum, social, economic and practical organizations of 
migratory mobility take place through interactions of 
varying nature and meaning between multiple actors 
at multiple locations. 
When smuggling goes wrong
Migrants from the Horn of Africa (mainly Ethiopians 
and Eritreans) face extremely challenging conditions 
during their journeys: first during their mobility across 
the Sahara Desert, when transiting Libya and finally 
while crossing the Mediterranean Sea before arriving 
at the European mainland. In recent years Khartoum 
(Sudan) has become an important transition hub 
for Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants and refugees 
entering the country. Once the financial, psychologi-
cal and material preparations for the journey are made, 
migrants proceed from this city to Libya via the Sahara 
desert with the hope of reaching Europe. 
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migrants’ countries of origin and transit, as well as the 
limited number of legal paths to mobility, instead of the 
targeting and criminalizing of migrants and smuggling 
facilitators and brokers.  Furthermore, empirical work 
on the changing nature of the smuggling operations 
that take into account the gender, generational and 
ethnic dimensions of smuggling and criminal activi-
ties inside the Sahara Desert and Libya must be carried 
out. 
migrants and hold them hostage for ransom in the 
Libyan desert or trade them to employers in Libya 
seeking cheap labor. There are also reports of sexual 
enslavement or the use of migrants for many other 
criminal activities. Some groups who once relied on 
mechanisms like pastoralism for their survival are now 
engaged in increasing violent actions against migrants 
for profit (Lucht, p. 32). This is the case of the Rashaida, 
a pastoral group known to engage in the kidnapping of 
Eritrean migrants on their journey to Sudan and even 
from the Shagarab refugee camp in Eastern Sudan 
(Belloni, 2015). There are unconfirmed, non-empirical 
claims that the Rashaida hold and torture migrants 
for illegal organ harvesting, but data are scant on this 
specific issue.  
Several state actors abuse migrants in a variety of 
settings, including prisons (cf. Triulzi, 2013; Frouws et 
al. 2014a). The fear of encountering security or military 
personnel during their journeys has also led smugglers 
to sometimes abandon migrants in the middle of the 
desert. When this happens, migrants are likely to end 
up in state custody and subsequently in jail – or in the 
worst of cases, to die as a result of exposure. Shootings 
between smugglers and robbers, or smugglers and 
border guards are commonplace. Migrants report that 
‘those who win take the migrants,’ who are seen as 
‘profitable trade subjects.’
Conclusion 
Ethnographic research on irregularized journeys in 
the Horn of Africa indicates that among migrants and 
their communities, smuggling is far from being mono-
lithically perceived as a criminal activity. It is instead a 
socially embedded collective practice, emerging in the 
context of restricted mobility and migration-control 
infrastructures where cross-border social networks, 
communication technologies, and brokering practices 
come together. 
The risks migrants from the Horn of Africa face 
en-route are part of and an extension of complex forms 
of structural violence: externalization of European 
borders, reproduction of humanitarian crises, unequal 
access to safe paths to mobility, etc., and are far from 
constituting a response to the actions of smugglers 
alone. Therefore, one answer should be tackling the 
underlying conditions that lead to the reliance on 
smuggling as a path to mobility. This requires address-
ing the socioeconomic problems and political crises in 
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The market for smuggling 
services  
According to fi gures released by the European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), some two million 
illegal border crossings (henceforth IBC) were 
recorded between 2010 and 2016 at the Greek and 
Italian borders. Th is contribution seeks to tease out the 
analytical features of the human smuggling market, 
exploring the macro-level evidence on IBCs and 
off ering policy-makers an analytical base upon which 
to build policy responses.3
Human smuggling is an illegal trade in which the 
commodity traded is primarily the illegal entry into a 
country (see Campana and Varese, 2016; Sanchez 2016; 
Zhang and Chin, 2002). Trade normally takes place in 
a market, which – by defi nition – is characterised by 
supply and demand. In this specifi c instance, migrants 
constitute the demand-side. Th ey are willing to buy a 
service, i.e. illegal entry into a country, for a variety 
of reasons (e.g., leaving war zones, poverty, economic 
2 Th is work was supported by a grant from the University 
of Cambridge (Co-PI with Professor Loraine Gelsthorpe). An 
earlier version of this contribution has appeared in Policing: A 
Journal of Police and Practice.
3 Due to space limitations, I can only off er here some 
preliminary remarks; a more detailed analysis is included in 
Campana 2017 and 2018.
hardship or persecution). Th e demand for smuggling 
services is satisfi ed by a number of sellers collectively 
defi ned as smugglers. 
Eastern and Central 
Mediterranean routes: macro-
level trends
IBCs into Greece and Italy refer respectively to crossings 
on the Eastern Mediterranean route (including the 
Aegean Sea) and the Central Mediterranean route. 
Figure 1 off ers an overview for both routes between 
2010-2016. 
Figure 1. Illegal Border Crossings (2010-2016)
Note: Central Mediterranean route is plotted on the left  scale; 
Eastern Mediterranean route on the right scale. Data from Frontex.
Both the Central Mediterranean route and, even more 
remarkably, the Eastern Mediterranean route showed a 
considerable increase in 2014 and 2015. Th e number of 
IBCs along the Eastern Mediterranean route increased 
by 1,641% from 2014 to 2015 (i.e., 885,386 illegal 
entries in 2015 compared to 50,834 in the previous 
year).  IBCs also increased along the Central Mediter-
ranean route: +199% between 2012 and 2013 followed 
by +277%. Interestingly, also this route recorded a 
+1,344% year-on-year change between 2010 and 2011: 
this is a level of growth similar to that registered by the 
Eastern Mediterranean route in 2015. Th erefore, the 
ability of the market for smuggling services (IBCs) to 
grow by very high rates does not appear to be a speci-
fi city of a single route. Instead when favourable con-
ditions arise, the market for IBCs is quick to expand. 
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Firstly, the absence of large monopolies. Arguably, mo-
nopolies would fi nd it hard to satisfy such a sudden 
and vast increase in demand for their services. On 
the contrary, the trends in the smuggling activi-
ties described seem to be consistent with a situation 
of market competition.  Secondly, assuming that a 
large number of new smugglers have indeed entered 
the market to satisfy the large and sudden increase in 
demand, the implication is that smuggling markets 
are likely to have low barriers to entry. Th irdly, the 
high rate of growth suggests that the level of resources 
required for an actor to enter the market successful-
ly or for an existing actor to expand his operations is 
likely to be relatively low. Th ese resources include skills 
and capital requirements. For incumbents, the set-up 
costs are also likely to be relatively low. 
I have argued elsewhere (Campana, 2016) that one of 
the key factors hindering the growth of human traffi  ck-
ing organisations is the high monitoring costs borne 
by traffi  ckers (i.e. the cost of monitoring victims). 
Although not directly comparable, a parallel reading 
of the data on IBCs and non-EU victims of human traf-
fi cking identifi ed in the European Union immediately 
shows that the two phenomena manifest themselves at a 
diff erent level of magnitude: on average, 2,198 non-EU 
victims of traffi  cking were identifi ed between 2010 and 
2012 (these are the most recent fi gures available: see 
Eurostat 2015: 39; cf. Figure 1). Th us, the expectation 
is that monitoring costs borne by off enders in the case 
of human smuggling are drastically lower than in the 
case of traffi  cking.
Finally, to support sudden and sizeable expansions 
in the market, smugglers and migrants alike need to 
rely on a fl exible infrastructure that is able to handle 
informal transnational payments. According to many 
sources, the hawala system 4of informal money transfer 
appears to perform this role well.
Policy implications
Th e ability of the market for smuggling services to grow 
exponentially and over a relatively short period of time 
poses a dramatic challenge for law enforcement au-
thorities and States alike. Th e presence of low barriers 
4 Hawala is an informal money transfer system based on 
trust; it is comparable to non-banking fi nancial institutions such 
as Western Union or MoneyGram. Hawala bankers carry out their 
service outside government control: they accept cash, cheques or 
other valuable goods at one location and pay a corresponding sum 
at another location (see van de Bunt 2008).
Figure 2 off ers a more fi ne-grained picture based on 
quarterly data. To take into account the seasonality 
of the phenomenon, each quarter is compared to the 
same quarter of the previous year). 
Figure 2. IBCs: Rate of change for Central 
Mediterranean (grey) and Eastern 
Mediterranean (black), Q1 2012 – Q2 2016.
Note: percentage of change year-on-year for each quarter.  Data 
from Frontex.
Th e ability of the market for IBCs to expand quickly is 
confi rmed by this quarterly analysis (see, for instance, 
the +3,011% between Q4/14 and Q4/15 in the Eastern 
Mediterranean). Th e graph also shows the likely eff ect 
of the implementation of the EU–Turkey agreement 
(second half of March 2016 onwards). Th e available 
evidence suggests that, while this agreement has fallen 
short of completely ’shutting down’ the Eastern Medi-
terranean route (as 182,277 IBCs were still recorded 
in 2016), there has been nonetheless a considerable 
decrease from the 2015 peak. It is worth noting here 
that the EU–Turkey agreement is based mostly on a 
set of land-based policies (as opposed to naval opera-
tions such as those carried out in the Central Mediter-
ranean).
Theoretical implications
Th e trends in smuggling activities in the Eastern and 
Central Mediterranean routes recorded between 2010 
and 2016 suggest that markets for smuggling services 
are able to grow considerably and oft en over a relative-
ly short period of time. What characteristics should a 
market possess to achieve an output consistent with 
such a pattern? 
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to entry and a competitive environment means that the 
market can meet sudden surges in demand, but also 
that the void created by the arrest of a single smuggler 
can quickly be filled by other actors. 
While the EU–Turkey agreement appears to have been 
relatively successful in decreasing IBCs in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, the EU naval operations in the Central 
Mediterranean do not appear to have been able to 
achieve the same outcome. It is difficult to imagine 
how naval operations in open sea can be successful in 
reducing the number of IBCs without adopting an Aus-
tralian-type policy of towing intercepted boats back to 
a third country (incidentally, this was done by Italy 
on May 6, 2009; on 23 February 2012, the European 
Court of Human Rights ruled the push-back of boats 
to Libya to be illegal: see Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 
27765/09). Amenta et al. (2016) have empirically tested 
the effect of naval operations on human smuggling in 
the Central Mediterranean, and have concluded that 
‘Operation Mare Nostrum’ and its replacements have 
increased the size of the phenomenon.
Land-based policies may prove to be more effective 
than sea operations. Smugglers appear to be rational 
actors who enter this market when the opportunities 
arise and the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore, 
working on the structure of incentives (and disin-
centives) in transit countries may prove to be a more 
effective strategy. Finally, there are indications that 
the market is more demand-driven than supply-
driven. This supports the adoption of wider policies 
that reduce the necessity to migrate and/or to rely on 
smugglers when needed. The adoption of schemes that 
resettle refugees directly from conflict zones is a step 
in this direction. 
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NORTH KOREA TO 
CHINA
Kyunghee Kook – University of Bristol
Introduction 
Since Kim Jong-Un began his rule in late December 
2011, North Korea’s border controls have been further 
tightened, while people’s movements have been in-
creasingly controlled, and patrols and stricter barriers 
have been built between North Korea and China. The 
numbers of defectors, according to South Korea’s Uni-
fication Ministry, have decreased significantly, with 
1,417 entering South Korea in 2016 – nearly half of 
those in 2012 (UNIKOREA, 2017).
There is scant empirical research on North Korean 
irregular migration. This contribution seeks to address 
that gap. Based on work conducted between 2011 and 
2016, it summarizes human smuggling dynamics from 
North Korea into China. It also provides policy recom-
mendations for the legal protection of North Koreans 
in China by exploring the rights of refugees and victims 
of trafficking in persons.  
The Contexts
After World War II, the establishment of a demilita-
rized zone created a border barrier dividing the Korean 
Peninsula into North and South Korea. North Korea 
(officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), 
closely policing its borders with Russia and China, has 
defined itself as a socialist state. Its people’s free 
movement to travel within the country and abroad has 
been widely restricted, and is allowed only for loyalists, 
politicians, party members and ordinary people in ex-
ceptional cases. This, combined with life-threatening 
food shortages, economic crises and political repres-
sion, has led North Koreans to migrate into China 
looking to survive (HRW, 2016) 
The act of crossing the border illegally is referred to 
as ‘crossing the river’ by North Koreans, as the border 
between China and North Korea is marked by the Yalu 
and Tumen Rivers. Since the Yalu is wide and deep, the 
Tumen is preferred for irregular journeys. Crossing 
the river is typically done on foot, especially during the 
winter months as its surface is frozen (International 
Crisis Group, 2006). 
There are two ways to cross into China: independent-
ly or with a smuggler. Rather than being constituted 
as mafia-like criminal organizations, most smugglers 
are North Korean nationals who managed to cross the 
border and then went on to offer smuggling services 
to other North Koreans independently. As they build 
up their success, they become regarded as “smugglers” 
by escapees. Some informal North Korean smugglers 
work mainly through their personal networks with 
family, cousins, friends, neighbours and acquaintanc-
es, whereas others have extended networks including 
military border guards in North Korea and China 
(Kook, forthcoming).  
While the unauthorised journey with smugglers is 
extremely perilous, migrants face specific risks once 
they have crossed the border. The Chinese government 
regards North Koreans as irregular migrants. Those 
detected and arrested by the authorities are forcefully 
repatriated to North Korea (Kim M 2010; Margesson 
et al. 2007). As irregular migrants, North Koreans in 
China remain underground, and therefore an accurate 
count is hard to estimate. However, numbers range 
between 30,000 and 125,000 migrants (Song 2013:401).
The South Korean Ministry of Unification (2017) keeps 
numbers of North Koreans who escaped to China and 
arrived in South Korea through a third country such 
as Thailand and Mongolia. Women comprise around 
seven percent of them, a number which has decreased 
since 2011. The number of North Korean defectors 
peaked at around 3,000 in 2009, yet dropped down 
rapidly to 1,1417 in 2011 by the start of Kim Jung-Un’s 
rule. He has tightened border controls by increasing 
patrols and punishments for smugglers and border-
crossers. North Korean and Chinese governments 
have also targeted smuggler and broker networks 
who assist North Koreans travel to China (HRW, 
2016). It is also worth noting that the smuggling fee 
has increased tenfold, from USD$800 dollars in 2010 
to USD$9,000 in 2011. A combination of strict border 
controls, more severe penalties and the targeting of 
smuggling networks have led to a significant decrease 
in the number of North Koreans who cross the river 
into China, or at least that is what the statistics suggest. 
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Smuggling also fails when the smugglers turn out to 
be traffickers in disguise or when smugglers hand 
migrants into exploitative occupations as soon as they 
manage to irregularly cross the border into China. The 
use of the term “trafficking”, however, hides a socially 
and politically complex reality. Many women pursue 
smuggling opportunities into arranged marriages or 
sex work as a mechanism to leave North Korea (Kook, 
forthcoming). Over the last three years there have been 
increasing reports of North Koreans being kidnapped. 
Reporting or asking for help from the police is not an 
option as their irregular status make them vulnerable 
to deportation to a country where prison camps awaits 
them. During interviews, most migrants said they 
would rather be exploited by traffickers than be sent to 
prison camps. 
Policy implications
To frame North Korean escapees’ situation as ‘traffick-
ing’ does not protect them. On the one hand, adopting 
the language of trafficking limits the scope of protec-
tion that can be given to those who have experienced 
a very specific and particular constellation of abuse 
and exploitation. It also excludes those who either 
manage to escape independently to avoid mistreat-
ment by employers or spouses in China. On the other 
hand, even those afforded the status of ‘victim of traf-
ficking’—not an easy feat, given that migrants must 
produce evidence demonstrating they were forced or 
deceived into moving and coerced into forced labour—
are not necessarily protected upon their return to 
North Korea (Kook, 2015:91-2). Although China has 
signed the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol in 2010, 
since it is subdued by its 1986 repatriation agreement 
with North Korea by which North Koreans are cat-
egorized as illegal economic migrants, North Korean 
women cannot in practice claim the rights afforded to 
victims, which leaves them vulnerable to trafficking. 
In other words, before they are classified and accepted 
as victims, they are treated as irregular migrants and 
thus repatriation to North Korea takes place prior to 
any protection. In sum, being established as a victim of 
trafficking or a refugee in China is not always advanta-
geous for North Koreans, as their illegal status is high-
lighted foremost (Margesson et al, 2007) and they thus 
remain highly susceptible to exploitation and human 
rights violations.  
When smuggling goes Wrong
When smuggling goes wrong, North Korean migrants 
risk physical harm, repatriation and the possibility 
of being trafficked. If detected by border guards and 
soldiers, defectors are shot at immediately. As the most 
common way to enter China is by the river, there is 
always a risk of being swept away during the summer, 
and of frostbite when walking over the frozen ice. 
Around ten percent of North Korean defectors who 
arrived in South Korea from China through a third 
country such as Thailand, Laos, and Mongolia, are 
mobility impaired as a result of having their feet or 
toes amputated (South Korean Ministry of Unifica-
tion, 2016). If caught near the border before crossing 
the river, migrants are deported back to North Korea 
and sent to prison camps. 
According to North Korean criminal law the repatri-
ated can be charged with leaving the country without 
permission and with betraying the people and the 
fatherland (Ministry of Justice of Republic of Korea, 
2002:55-56). They are sent to labor training (Rodong 
danryundae), or to re-education camps (Kyowhaso). 
Witnesses report human rights violations such as 
forced labour, beating, torture, starvation, unsanitary 
conditions, sexual abuse, and human experimentation 
(Davis, 2006:135; Margesson et al. 2007:9).
In the case of smugglers, if arrested, penalties are much 
more severe. If caught either in China or North Korea, 
smugglers are defined as political criminals instigating 
ordinary North Koreans to betray their leader by sup-
porting their journey out of the regime. Smugglers are 
given sentences longer than those given to defectors 
in re-education camps. They are also sent to political 
camps (Kwalliso) where release is unlikely, or sentenced 
to public execution in extreme cases. For these reasons, 
smugglers are most often vested in the escapees’ suc-
cessful attempts, rather than focusing on solely making 
profit from them.
Even when North Korean escapees cross the border 
into China successfully and manage to go under-
ground, their condition as irregular migrants means 
they are at risk of being detected and sent back to 
North Korea. This happens quite often as the Chinese 
government rewards those who report North Korean 
migrants –leading them to be known as ‘moving cash 
points.’  In other words, their illegal status and repatria-
tion outcome creates the conditions for North Koreans 
to be vulnerable to exploitation and violence.   
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It has been suggested that migration and refugee 
policies can be pursued to ameliorate the plight of 
North Koreans in China. China can ratify the Interna-
tional Convention on Migrant Workers and Members 
of their Family for North Korea migrants and the 
Smuggling of Migrants Protocol, which protects 
the basic human rights of migrants. Although more 
effective policy should come from North Korea itself, 
this country is unlikely to work on promoting human 
rights or grant free movement to its people. 
China, moreover, should reconsider its political agenda 
in favor of one that grants humanitarian rights to 
North Koreans in China in line with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1967 Refugees Protocol. As the 
UN Commission of Inquiry has suggested (UNOCI, 
2014) if granting refugee status is not possible, the 
Chinese government can still halt the repatriation of 
North Koreans, and instead forward them to other 
countries, including South Korea, where they can 
receive immediate citizenship. In order to do so, the 
South Korean government should also be supportive 
of North Korean escapees in China. 
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Stephanie Leutert, University of Texas at Austin 
and Caitlyn Yates –IBI Consultants
In the popular imagination surrounding migration 
through Mexico, the infamous train network “La 
Bestia” looms large. The images of migrants clinging 
to trains have come to represent migration through 
Mexico and Mexico’s migratory policies. Yet, despite 
being the most often characterized form of migration 
through Mexico, only between 10 and 20 percent of 
transit migrants ride the train on their journey north 
to the United States (COLEF 2017). After Mexico 
announced Plan Frontera Sur in July 2014—a major 
border security and immigration strategy—this per-
centage dropped even lower.  
The present contribution addresses how smugglers 
bypass the train network to move migrants north, 
relying on buses, trailers, and private vehicles, along 
Mexico’s highway system. By analyzing smuggling 
reports from both before and after Plan Frontera 
Sur, our contribution describes migrants’ increasing 
reliance on more undetectable forms of transportation, 
and the risks associated with them.
This study relied on a mixed-methods approach to 
identify reliance on other forms of transportation. 
This included the creation of a database of 179 entries 
of human smuggling cases occurring along the U.S. 
and Mexican highway systems in the period between 
January 2003 and August 2017. The cases were coded 
by vehicle type, smuggled migrants’ demograph-
ics, location where migrants were found, and when 
available, information on smugglers and their practices. 
The information was cross-referenced against data 
from Mexico’s Attorney General’s office (PGR), surveys 
of deported Central American migrants conducted by 
El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), and also 
supplemented by qualitative interviews and targeted 
open-source research. 
The data indicates that after Plan Frontera Sur’s imple-
mentation in June 2014, migrants’ reliance on Mexico’s 
train network decreased, while there was a continued 
reliance on the use of vehicles. In the two years that 
preceded the implementation of the Plan, an average 
of 18 percent of surveyed Central Americans reported 
riding the trains during their last trip through Mexico. 
By 2014—as the number of migration enforcement 
operations increased—use of the trains dropped to 12 
percent. Simultaneously, the data shows an increase in 
the number of Central American irregular migrants 
that used vehicles at one point in their journey through 
Mexico. For private vehicles, this percentage rose from 
16 percent pre-Plan to 26 percent in 2016; for buses, it 
jumped from 86 percent to 93 percent, and for cargo 
trailers it inched up slightly from 9 percent to 10 
percent (COLEF 2017).
Despite the larger percentage of migrants traveling in 
vehicles for at least part of the journey, the migration 
routes did not appear to change. Smugglers continued 
to overwhelmingly favor the major highway routes 
throughout the country—probably because they are the 
fastest and safest roads—as highlighted in the vehicle 
apprehension maps below. One notable difference pre- 
and post-Plan Frontera Sur was the greater number 
of vehicle apprehensions in Mexico’s northern region, 
which allowed for greater visibility of smuggling routes 
in this section of the country.
Similarly, the profiles of migrants traveling through 
Mexico via vehicles remained largely consistent, with 
the vast majority of travelers continuing to originate 
from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (Isacson 
et al 2017), and with women making up an average 
of 20 percent of total migrants. However, there have 
also been an increasing number of minors reported 
in the apprehended vehicles since the implementation 
of the Plan. This finding matches the general trends 
in Mexican and U.S. migrant apprehension data that 
show increasing percentages of minors (both accompa-
nied and unaccompanied) transiting through Mexico 
since 2014 (US Customs and Border Patrol 2017; Sec-
retaría de Gobernación 2017). The profiles of migrant 
smugglers along Mexican highways remained relative-
ly consistent throughout the dataset: they are almost 
exclusively male, Mexican in origin, and between the 
ages of 20 and 40. 
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Th e dataset also highlights the dangers associated 
with human smuggling in vehicles. Th ere were seven 
recorded incidents involving migrant deaths or injuries 
in Mexico and the United States. While this equals 
around 4 percent of the recorded cases, there are other 
risks that come with being smuggled in a vehicle, and 
particularly in a cargo truck. Th e most common risks 
are the eff ects from the potentially extreme tempera-
tures migrants face while traveling in trucks without 
air conditioning in the summer heat. In addition to 
facing extreme temperatures —from below freezing 
temperatures in refrigerated trucks to up to 60 degrees 
Celsius— migrants are vulnerable to dehydration and 
starvation as a result of limited food and water avail-
ability, hyperthermia, hypothermia, and asphyxiation. 
Th e risks faced while riding cargo trucks are diff erent 
from those involving the trains. Surveys conducted in 
2016 reveal that individuals traveling in the former 
were almost three times more likely to experience 
extreme cold throughout the journey and almost twice 
as likely to suff er from a lack of food or drink (COLEF 
2017). However, traveling by vehicle may reduce the 
likelihood of being robbed or of enduring a serious 
injury as a result of falling off  the train (COLEF 2017).
Recommendations
For the previous three decades, Mexico pursued re-
strictive migration policies, including erecting more 
checkpoints and mobile revisions across larger geo-
graphic areas. However, this strategy had two serious 
consequences. Th e fi rst was increased corruption as 
smugglers sought out offi  cials who could be bribed to 
pass migrants through, leading to the eventual erosion 
of the legitimacy of security and immigration institu-
tions enforcing controls. Th e second was of a humani-
tarian nature, and involved a high number of accidents, 
assaults, forced disappearances and deaths among 
migrants as they attempted to circumvent checkpoints 
in their journeys through Mexico.
Mexico’s migratory policy is currently evolving, but 
policymakers continue to rely on restrictive policies 
toward transit migration, leading smugglers and 
migrants to do as they have in the past and embrace 
an ever more diverse array of smuggling practices that 
continue to put human life at risk. To comprehensively 
address the dangers associated with transit migration 
requires steps to regularize irregular migrant popu-
lations, or at least to off er greater forms of interna-
tional protection and/or temporary visas to people in 
transit. However, given the unlikelihood of large-scale 
migratory policy changes in the short or medium term, 
Mexican offi  cials and non-governmental organizations 
could instead look to improve the situation for transit 
migrants traveling in vehicles through smaller policy 
shift s. Th ese could include: 
• Mandating the installation of handles or emergency 
signals from inside cargo/trailer trucks and vehicle 
trunks. One of the greatest risks that migrants face 
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while traveling inside cargo trucks comes from 
their inability to exit vehicles during emergency 
situations. Migrants often face hyperthermia or 
asphyxiation associated with rising temperatures, 
aggravated by the lack of oxygen and water, espe-
cially when vehicles are abandoned by scared or 
even unaware drivers (see Hui and du Lack, 2017). 
Similar to vehicle requirements that demand 
passenger vehicles have internal trunk releases, 
measures that order cargo trucks to be equipped 
with mechanisms that allow them to be unlocked 
from the inside out or to signal to other drivers in 
case of an emergency can be implemented.
• Best-practices campaigns to include information 
on cargo truck related risks. The Red Cross and 
other para and non-governmental organiza-
tions have launched campaigns to provide tips to 
migrants crossing Mexico via the country’s train 
network. These campaigns include the distribu-
tion of fact sheets with travel recommendations 
(e.g. not boarding a moving train during a rain-
storm, bringing a piece of cardboard to sit on, etc.) 
These fact sheets have yet to include recommen-
dations pertaining to travel in cargo trucks, and 
therefore new versions could include tips such as 
bringing portable phone chargers in case migrants 
need to call for help from within a truck. These fact 
sheets could be distributed in countries of origin, 
as evidence indicates migrants using vehicles to 
transit through Mexico generally tend not to have 
much contact with migrant shelters or NGOs while 
crossing through the country (COLEF 2017). 
• Prioritizing access to justice. The Specialized Unit 
for Investigating Crimes Against Migrants from 
Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office (PGR) reports 
having an active caseload of 111 files involving 
crimes committed against migrants and admits that 
‘there are no definite results on the vast majority 
of cases” (Unidad 2017:23). It is unclear how the 
Unit prioritizes these cases. While the increase in 
the number of staff members can be seen as sign 
of progress, Mexico’s PGR should issue a directive 
to focus its prosecutorial energy on investigating 
open cases and identifying those who are respon-
sible for crimes against migrants. 
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as a central partner. The vast majority of West African 
migrants to Europe –  more than 300,000 in 2016 
according to the IOM – transit through Niger to reach 
Libya and the smuggling routes across the Mediter-
ranean to Italy. It is a hard and dangerous journey 
through inhospitable territory and into a Libya in such 
disarray that, according to some reports, it claims even 
more lives than the sea journey to Europe. To pursue 
a safer and more organized means of transportation is 
therefore a key issue for West African migrants.  
In 2015, a new law against smuggling of migrants 
–  formulated according to the United Nations 
Smuggling of Migrants Protocol and with the assis-
tance of UNODC –  was passed in the parliament in 
Niamey. About a year later, the law was implement-
ed and the Nigerien police forces began to arrest 
smuggling facilitators and drivers, and seized cars used 
to transport migrants across the desert. These efforts 
were primarily felt in the northern region of Agadez, 
leading to considerable local anger and giving rise to 
local tensions (Zandonini, 2017). In Niamey too, the 
police located and arrested connection men at the bus 
stations and accused them of smuggling. 
Thinking of Ghanaian connection men, many of whom 
are now either in jail or have fled Niger, the question 
becomes: how has the implementation of the new anti-
smuggling law in Niger affected their work and lives? 
Has it created a safer environment for migrants on the 
move? To address the question, this contribution first 
looks at what work the connection men do and how 
the services they provide are viewed by themselves and 
by migrants.
Migrants, like everybody else, need to have a feeling 
that their lives are going places, moving forward, and 
that they have a chance of escaping the stasis of village 
life that is hampering so many places in West Africa. 
This quest is not just financial, but social and existen-
tial too. This is probably the attraction of the connec-
tion man: keeping the dream alive for those who need 
to see change the most.
Ghanaian connection men were all former migrants 
that had run out of luck and for various reasons ended 
up as stranded people in Niger. Yet they refused to give 
up the hope of making it to Europe. They instead began 
brokering paths for their compatriots – the journey that 
they have failed to make themselves – while waiting for 
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The Agadez province in northern Niger has in recent 
decades emerged as the nucleus for trans-Saharan 
migration to Libya and the irregular routes across 
the Mediterranean to Europe. Based on ethnographic 
fieldwork in Niger, this contribution discusses the work 
of Ghanaian connection men (low-level migration fa-
cilitators) on the desert trail as they struggle to accom-
modate local needs for mobility in a time of EU-driven 
control and confinement. 
Ghanaian connection men or migration brokers in 
Niger understand and negotiate the dangers of the 
desert vis-à-vis the responsibility for the passengers 
under their authority;5  migrant brokers’ desire for 
quick profit is weighed up against the potential loss of 
migrant lives in the desert, as well as the human and 
social responsibilities towards migrants that use their 
services. In this light this contribution asks whether 
the definition of smuggling captures the full complex-
ity of migration brokerage in a disjointed world, and 
how anti-smuggling practice must be conscious of its 
unintended consequences on the safety of migrants.
In a time when the EU is expanding its range of inter-
ventions in the Sahelian countries, Niger has emerged 
5 For further analysis on the work of connection men, see 
Lucht, Hans 2013: ‘’Ghanaian connection men and the expansion 
of the EU’s border regimes into Africa.’’ In Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
Thomas and Nyberg Sorensen, Nina, eds. The Migration Industry 
and the Commercialization of International Migration. Routledge: 
London and New York. p.173-189. Lucht, Hans 2015. “The Station 
Hustle: Ghanaian Migration Brokerage in a Disjointed World“. 
In Jackson, Michael and Albert Piette, eds. What is Existential 
Anthropology. New York and Oxford: Berghahn. Lucht, Hans 
2016. “Death of a Gin Salesman: Hope and Despair among 
Ghanaian Migrants and Deportees Stranded in Niger“. In Kleist, N. 
and Thorsen, D. Hope and Uncertainty in Contemporary African 
Migration. New York and London: Routledge
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Their work basically consisted of greeting migrants 
coming from Accra on the bus and guiding them to the 
bus to Agadez, and setting them up with a ‘ghetto’ in 
the desert (this is the name migrants give to the halfway 
houses  where they await further transportation into 
the desert, and finally Libya). For these services con-
nection men were paid by the migrants themselves, by 
the ‘ghetto bosses’ who were supplied with a flow of 
new migrants, and by the bus station, where they had 
a kind of semi-official affiliation. Here connection men 
were tolerated and allowed to spend time and wait. 
Sometimes they even wore a coat with the name of 
the station without being formally employed. But they 
were, by and large, independent operators that took 
orders from no one. 
The organization of the migration networks – at least 
prior to reaching Agadez – is not really well-organized 
and interconnected, as often popularly imagined, but 
more decentralized and intermediary. To some extent 
this puts the individual connection man in a position 
of power vis-à-vis the smuggling networks in the 
desert. They need him to provide them with a flow 
of passengers, and the connection man has a relative 
position of autonomy to work with someone else if 
financial demands are not met or the operation is not 
trustworthy or safe. On the other hand, the connection 
men had little control over the fate of the passengers 
once they were passed on to a ‘ghetto’ boss in Agadez.
The connection men all had dramatic and failed 
migration trajectories behind them and had eventually 
relocated to Niger. In fact, by a strange turn of events, 
their many misfortunes on the road had become their 
social capital. They had first-hand knowledge of all the 
dangers and all the misery that await those who leave 
their homes to look for brighter opportunities. And to 
the migrants, the connection men in the desert control 
what is most desired: access to the outside world, and 
to the human need to be ‘going places’ when one’s own 
world no longer offers such necessary mobility.
In this sense, the connection man is a typical West 
African trickster figure –  someone who’s approached 
at a risk but who holds the keys to social and material 
advancement beyond one’s wildest dreams. He’s a 
hustler, perhaps even a killer, and at the very same time 
a guardian of local aspirations in a disjointed world. 
Indeed, the connection man represents a form of glo-
balization from below, as Jean-Francois Bayart would 
say; a very particular form of global political subject 
that emerges in a dialogue with certain economic and 
political realities. Therefore, the term ‘smuggler’ does 
not really do justice to all the forces at play here, or to 
social reality from a migrant perspective.
Further, the legal discourse on mobility does not 
reflect how migrants see the connection men or how 
these men see themselves and enact their roles as fa-
cilitators of mobility –not as criminals, but as agents of 
change who play their part, legal or not, in the practical 
governance of the EU-African borderlands. Maybe it 
is too often assumed in political and public debates 
in Europe that our legal distinctions on mobility – or 
legal distinctions that are driven by European political 
interests – have any bearing on the choices of those 
who need to move the most.
The connection men are usually embedded in the 
Ghanaian expat community and run semi-official busi-
nesses with semi-official arrangements with local bus 
stations or local big men. Their roles entail responsibil-
ities to the migrants that go beyond financial arrange-
ments, for example arranging return transportation 
of the sick or injured or mentally distressed migrants. 
This, however, does not fit the clear-cut image of the 
smuggler that the new law is targeting (see Achilli, this 
volume).
The UN-backed anti-smuggling law has, however, 
dramatically changed the face of irregular migration 
in Niger, especially in the Agadez province, but also 
further down the line in the bus stations in Niamey 
(see Micalleff, this volume). The traditional semi-
official connection man is now a thing of the past in 
Niger. They are all either in prison or have fled the 
country and new operators are moving in to take 
over the market. It remains to be seen how this new 
situation –  the illegalization of migration brokerage 
– will affect migrant safety. One guess is that migrants 
will meet the smuggling rings at an earlier point on the 
journey, maybe even directly from home. In Agadez, 
the immediate effect of the crack down on smuggling 
has been to the detriment of migrant safety. Trucks 
now leave in the night with no headlights on, and 
along more difficult and dangerous routes, and the 
smugglers, for fear of the police, dump passengers in 
the desert if they think they have been seen. 
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Recommendations
Europe must be mindful of the unintended conse-
quences of the intervention against irregular migration 
in Niger. New and more cynical smuggling networks 
may benefit and the criminalization of migration could 
work to the detriment of migrant safety. Though it is 
certainly legitimate to want to protect one’s frontiers in 
a time of terror and cross-border crime, Europe should 
be concerned that the intervention against smuggling 
is creating considerable local tensions, especially in the 
Agadez province.
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rendered the business far more networked and efficient 
than it ever was before. However, the changes that took 
place after 2011 also need to be set within the context 
of Libya’s history and the conditions of post-Qaddafi 
Libya. That is this essay’s goal.
The Libya that was born out of the post war compro-
mise of 1949, later enshrined in the 1951 federalist 
constitution, never successfully rallied the country’s 
ancient sub-national communities under the insti-
tutions of the state or a unifying national ideology. 
Qaddafi’s bloodless coup in 1969 decisively undercut 
this embryonic project and deliberately set out to 
undermine state institutions, replacing them with a 
system of patronage –fuelled in part by the country’s 
burgeoning oil economy –and repression (Vandevalle 
2015).
The careful manipulation of the smuggling economy 
was very much part of the regime’s strategy for control. 
Tribes, families and communities that were loyal to the 
regime were given access and ascendancy over the ones 
that did not (Shaw and Mangan 2014). In the words of 
the former US Ambassador to Libya, Deborah Jones, 
“when Gaddafi departed the scene, Libya by now both 
fragmented but heavily networked, became essentially 
a mafia without a Don. Gaddafi was gone but his legacy 
remained” (2017).
In the euphoric first year after the revolution, the 
removal of central control translated itself into market 
liberalisation. However, by the end of 2012, the scene 
came to be dominated by the multitude of militias that 
now make up the Libyan political canvas. During this 
time, the political process had already started stutter-
ing. Disarmament efforts were undermined externally 
by foreign states sponsoring armed groups that could 
further their agenda, and internally by important 
Libyan political brokers able to put militias loyal to 
them on a state payroll.
The armed groups and associated communities that 
had no access to this gravy train (especially the case 
for those in border areas) sought to exploit whatever 
resource was found in their territory. For many, this 
meant turning to the smuggling economy. Initially, this 
produced classic protection rackets, in which militias 
essentially taxed activity in their territory. Eventu-
ally, they started running their own operations or 
partnered with seasoned smugglers to form criminal 
ventures (Micallef, 2017). In this sense, migrants 
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Since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 
more than 750,000 migrants and asylum seekers have 
crossed to Italy through the Central Mediterranean, 
the vast majority of them starting their sea voyage 
from Libya. Conservatively, it is estimated that more 
than 15,000 have died attempting to cross that stretch 
of sea during this time.6
The phenomenon did not start with the revolution. 
Libya has been a regional funnel for Africans headed 
north since at least the turn of the century (see Ayalew, 
this volume). Nonetheless, the situation has escalated 
dramatically since the collapse of the North African 
state.7
At the most basic level of analysis, the collapse of 
Libya’s security apparatus gave the human smuggling 
and trafficking industry greater latitude to expand its 
capacity and develop transnational connections that 
6 For historic data on arrivals see the Frontex 
Mediterranean Route Update: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-
and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/ For statistics on deaths 
see IOM’s Missing Migrants Project: https://missingmigrants.iom.
int/region/mediterranean 
7 The number of people crossing raised from 40,000 
arrivals a year prior to the revolution, to a yearly average of almost 
170,000 between 2014 and 2016, and which will likely be sustained 
over 2017 with almost 120,000 people having crossed by November 
15, 2017. This calculation is based on arrivals statistics from 
Frontex, and the UNHCR’s data portal, http://data2.unhcr.org.
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it is only marginally relevant to the overall analysis as it 
is clear that named smuggling militias took on law-en-
forcement roles after receiving funding by state entities 
governed by the GNA (Micallef and Reitano, 2017).
The Sabratha deal, which left out other major players 
involved in smuggling, provoked confrontations in 
the town over September and October. Over a 19-day 
conflict, 39 people were killed and almost 300 injured. 
More than 15,000 Libyans were displaced, along with 
an equal number of largely sub-Saharan migrants, 
many of them previously unaccounted for, having been 
held in smuggling warehouses or unmarked detention 
centres.8
Militia co-option is not a new phenomenon in post-
revolution Libya (Shaw and Reitano 2017). However, 
the fact that this latest action is widely viewed as 
forming part of Europe’s strategy of stemming the flow 
of migrants coming out of Libya – whether intended 
or not – signals to militias that there are opportuni-
ties to be had in aligning their predation to the anti-
smuggling agenda. In the process, Libyan stability and 
the state-building process are sabotaged as recruited 
militias get to launder their reputations without giving 
up their organisational integrity or their agendas. 
Moreover, in the new anti-smuggling business that 
risks being created, migrants remain a commodity to 
be exploited as targets for detention, indentured labour 
and extortion.
Policy recommendations
• Stability first policy: the International communi-
ty should renew its commitment to a stability first 
policy. Only a stable Libya can enable a long-term 
mixed-migration management plan for the coun-
try – a point of convergence for most stakeholders 
engaged with this phenomenon.
• UN-led process: the UN Special Envoy for Libya, 
Ghassan Salame, should be given the space and 
support to deliver on his mandate without side in-
terventions by member states that risk undermin-
ing his critical work.
8 See Displacement Tracking Matrix Libya, 
Sabratha Flash Report, IOM, October, 12, 2017, http://
www.globaldtm.info/libya/, and UNHCR, UNHCR Flash 
Update, ReliefWeb, October 16, 2017, https://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/f i les/resources/UNHCR%20Sabratha 
%20Flash%20Update%2016%20October%202017%20FINAL.PDF. 
predation that pervades Libya’s present socio-political 
landscape (Tabib, 2014).
It is in this context that the international engagement 
with Libya on migration needs to be understood. 
Ongoing conflict and instability prevented the EU 
from replicating in Libya the solution developed for 
the Aegean with the closure of the so-called “Balkan 
Route”, and a border management deal with Turkey (see 
European Commission 2016). Instead the bloc funded 
an offshore anti-smuggling operation in the Mediterra-
nean and launched a programme of capacity building 
aimed at the country’s struggling migration manage-
ment and border control apparatus. More importantly, 
it partnered with Libya’s southern neighbours in cash-
for-migration-control schemes with a view to decreas-
ing the number of migrants crossing into Libya in the 
first place. While there is some evidence that these 
latter actions are producing the intended slowdown 
in traffic, especially in Niger (Saley 2017), the likely 
effects will only be seen in the medium term.
Simultaneously, Italy –which has been handling the 
flow of people coming out of Libya almost single-
handedly –has over the past few years embarked on 
its own, more short-term oriented plan. Italy’s multi-
dimensional strategy engaged more directly the Gov-
ernment of National Accord (GNA) and its border 
control apparatus, as well as several municipalities and 
tribes in smuggling hubs across Libya. This culminated 
in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) in February 2017. The MOU is rather vague 
in its wording but essentially it promises development 
and investment in return for the policing of irregular 
migration (El Zaidy 2017).
In June 2017, this drive culminated in the co-opting of 
some coastal militias known to be involved in human 
smuggling in the coastal smuggling hubs of Sabratha 
and Zawiya. Virtually overnight, key smuggling outfits 
turned into law enforcement units. The effect on de-
partures was extraordinary: July saw a reduction in 
arrivals of 51 percent over the corresponding month 
in 2016, which decreased to 83 percent in August 
before climbing moderately to a still substantial 65 
to 68 percent reduction in September and October 
(UNHCR 2017).
It has been speculated that the co-opted militias were 
paid off by the Italian intelligence services (Lewis and 
Schrer 2017) – a charge the Italian government has 
denied. So far this claim has been unverified. Moreover, 
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• Exploit militias’ quest for legitimacy: many mi-
litia leaders sense that Libya is at a juncture where 
the end of the present political status quo is near, 
be it by military or political means. This analysis 
is driving their quest to legitimise their operations 
– a fact that can be exploited to produce genuine 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
into state structures under an agreed governance 
framework.
• Investment in greater conflict sensitivity: the 
international community’s visibility on Libya re-
mains relatively weak. Action should be based on a 
better granular understanding of dynamics on the 
ground.
• Break away from hyper-focus on migration: Lib-
yans will never truly get behind migration man-
agement if these actions keep being perceived as 
a foreign intervention. This is no small task but it 
starts with the international community engaging 
more meaningfully in organised crime priorities 
that impact the lives of Libyan citizens, such as 
commodity smuggling and kidnappings.
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kidnapping are highly problematic and media repre-
sentations are often characterized by a sensationalist 
focus on its violence. In terms of research attention, a 
tendency still remains to focus upon more orthodox 
kidnapping forms –kidnap for ransom of wealthy 
elites or the more politically and ideologically-oriented 
kidnappings conducted by terrorist organisations– to 
the neglect of other, more complex mutations of this 
illicit practice. Quite simply, kidnapping is an age-old 
criminal phenomenon, but its contemporary manifes-
tations are shaped by both local dynamics and global 
patterns, migrant kidnapping providing a very effective 
example. 
Drawing upon ongoing research into kidnapping in 
Mexico, this paper highlights the acute research chal-
lenges that confront those investigating this phenom-
enon, as well as potentially more effective means to 
respond to its threat. Our work proposes new research 
and policy approaches that seek not only to shed new 
light on this illicit practice, but also to foster new strate-
gies of intervention to counter and respond to kidnap-
ping. Whilst this project has been designed towards 
promoting more sustainable security in the face of kid-
napping in Mexico, its ambitions have wider relevance. 
Promoting a more nuanced, less sensationalised, un-
derstanding of kidnapping; capturing more useful data 
regarding this evasive criminal practice; co-producing 
counter-kidnapping resources that assist those most 
affected by this insecurity: these objectives all offer 
new possibilities to shape effective policy responses 
towards kidnapping. 
Kidnapping in Mexico
Kidnapping has emerged as a massive source of societal 
insecurity in Mexico. In a context of fear, mass distrust 
of law enforcement, failed state initiatives and high-lev-
els of impunity, the insecurity born of kidnapping has 
become pervasive and the country is viewed as a global 
kidnapping hotspot. As Ochoa remarks in one of the 
more empirically-robust investigations of kidnapping 
in Mexico City, it is ‘[n]ot just the rich’ who are now 
targeted, victimization having undergone a process 
of ‘democratization’.11 Whilst wealthy elites insulate 
themselves from kidnap risk through private security 
measures, as well as leveraging political and economic 
capital to enhance their protection, cash-rich (but 
11 Ochoa, R. (2012) ‘Not just the rich: new tendencies in 
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Introduction
Kidnapping is bound-up with issues of (in)security 
and (im)mobility. It entails deprivation of liberty but 
is also a crime threat that travels. It is a source of mass 
insecurity across diverse states where impunity reigns, 
but is also an emergent feature of smuggling discourse. 
In terms of this collection’s focus upon what happens 
when smuggling goes wrong, kidnapping represents a 
violent and parasitic by-product of irregular migration. 
It has been charted across transit routes through 
countries such as Mexico and Libya where migrants’ 
precarious mobility leaves them vulnerable to criminal 
exploitation. The scale of this illicit practice is commu-
nicated in public representations of kidnapping that 
present its pervasive prevalence through terms such 
as ‘epidemic,’ ‘industry;’ and even ‘business’ (the latter 
reflecting how both licit and illicit private actors derive 
profit from kidnap and ransom scenarios).10
However, despite the significant media attention that 
highlights kidnapping victimization–whether in terms 
of domestic citizens or smuggled migrants– this phe-
nomenon remains comparatively under-examined, 
under-theorised and neglected in terms of policy 
intervention. Certainly, the increased incidence of 
violent, exploitative abductions across the globe is ac-
knowledged, but the sources informing debate around 
9 I am grateful to the Workshop organisers and 
participants for their comments. and to my project colleagues, 
Ernesto Schwartz-Marin and Sonja Marzi, for their respective 
assistance with this presentation. The Project ‘Mobile Solutions 
to the Mexican Kidnapping Epidemic: Beyond Elite Counter-
Measures, Towards Citizen-Led Innovation’ is being funded by the 
RCUK Newton Fund.  
10  See, Lakhani, N. (2017) ‘Mexican kidnappers pile misery 
on to Central Americans fleeing violence’, The Guardian, February 
21st, 2017; Leutert, S. (2016) ‘The migrant kidnapping epidemic 
next door’, Lawfare, November 30th, 2016.
CAPTURING (IM)MOBILITY: THE CHALLENGES OF KIDNAPPING RESEARCH - Conor O’Reilly
27
mobility poor) targets from within the middle/lower 
classes are increasingly targeted– sometimes multiple 
times. The threat is such that non-victims take kidnap 
risk into account as a matter of daily routine.
Of course, other contextual specifics also shape the 
topography of kidnapping across Mexico, not least 
ongoing narco-violence and the resultant insecurity, 
exacerbated by interventions such as the Mérida Ini-
tiative and its militarizing impact. Mexico’s location 
as a transit country for Central American refugees 
and migrants travelling to the United States, has also 
witnessed them becoming kidnap targets for criminal 
groups and cartels such as Los Zetas, who derive 
massive profits from migrant kidnapping. These ab-
ductions represent one of a range of predatory crimes 
to which migrants may fall victim during their arduous 
travel north.12
The Challenges of Kidnapping 
Research
The entry point for much commentary on kidnap-
ping is, all too often, disturbing statistics or graphic 
accounts of the human suffering it causes.13 Making a 
spectacle of kidnap-related violence and suffering, or 
promoting problematic statistical claims, are unhelpful 
entry-points to an illicit practice that remains poorly 
understood. We must look for stronger empirical foun-
dations to better comprehend and address kidnapping. 
This is easier said than done. To pursue impactful 
research, we must first acknowledge the unique com-
bination of challenges that are posed by kidnapping 
research.
Kidnapping is a highly-sensitive research subject. It 
is taboo for many Mexicans, who even if they have 
not personally experienced its effects, are aware of, 
and inhibited by, its threat. For those who have been 
directly affected –whether as a kidnap victim or their 
relative or friend– this is a heavily traumatic experi-
ence which they may constantly relive, but have little 
wish to re-visit. Even before engaging with research 
into kidnapping, we must recognise that many of those 
12 Vogt, W. (2016) ‘Stuck in the middle with you: The 
intimate labours of mobility and smuggling along Mexico’s migrant 
route’, GeoPolitics, 21/2: 366-386.
13 For example, the gruesome massacre of 72 kidnapped 
migrants in August 2010 by the Los Zetas cartel in a safe house in 
San Fernando, Tamaulipas became a staple feature of media and 
academic coverage of migrant kidnapping for subsequent years.
affected will not report it to the authorities, whether 
due to fear of reprisal by kidnappers, or through fear 
of law enforcement complicity. In the case of irregular 
migrants, they may also fear deportation. These 
concerns all render issues of access, consent and ethics 
especially challenging.
Under-reporting inevitably renders statistical claims 
regarding kidnapping problematic. However, public 
commentary on kidnapping still betrays a desire for 
quantification and there are multiple attempts to 
impose form onto this opaque criminal practice –albeit 
that to do so is to try and measure the unmeasurable.14 
Public security agencies, public research organisations, 
human rights NGOs, anti-kidnapping activists and 
private security companies all compile kidnapping sta-
tistics. However, these diverse sources are marked by 
huge disparities, as well as methodological blind spots. 
For example, the 2014 collation of official reports by 
the Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de 
Seguridad Pública placed the number of kidnappings at 
1,395 whilst the victimization surveys of the Encuesta 
Nacional de Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad 
Pública estimated 102,883 kidnappings for the same 
year. Figures from other groups fall between this range. 
Official reports/statistics are also shaped by variable 
police reporting patterns. In Mexico, there are concerns 
about inconsistencies in reporting practices across 
the country, as well as general under-reporting. Even 
victims’ families may intentionally corrupt kidnap sta-
tistics in their pursuit of missing loved ones. A recent 
project by the Mexico-lead within our research team 
uncovered that some relatives of the disappeared in 
Mexico fabricated ransom requests to trigger police in-
vestigations, as police would investigate a documented 
kidnapping, but not a disappearance. Kidnapping sta-
tistics must, therefore, be subject to significant caveats 
and more effective ways to collect/compile kidnap sta-
tistics explored.
Kidnapping research must also account for the 
multiple, and mutating, manifestations of this criminal 
phenomenon. In the Mexican context, kidnapping 
is not a distinct criminal activity, but one that both 
takes different forms and is also part of a spectrum of 
criminality. It may be carefully planned or opportun-
istic. It may be a traditional case of extorting ransom, 
14 Merry, S.E. (2016) The Seductions of Quantification: 
Measuring Human Rights, Gender Violence, and Sex Trafficking. 
London: University of Chicago Press.
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perceived as, at best ineffective, or at worst complicit, 
in the illicit practice they are tasked with combatting, 
then state initiatives will encounter limited public con-
fidence and support.
Such criticisms also apply to transnational initiatives, 
given that these have traditionally prioritized assis-
tance to state actors (e.g. in terms of criminal justice 
reform or police training). A case in point is the 
UNODC’s Manual de Lucha Contra el Secuestro (Anti-
Kidnapping Manual) which principally offered support 
to public institutions in Latin America that were con-
fronting this threat. Whilst the importance of devel-
oping community participation was acknowledged in 
this UNODC initiative, its cornerstone of advice and 
assistance to state actors was criticised by commen-
tators who reflected that ‘the irony surrounding this 
manual is that some of its contributors are officials in 
countries that have yet to curb the practice of kidnap-
ping within their own borders’.15 
Citizen-Led Counter 
Kidnapping: A Better Way 
Forward 
Our project on kidnapping in Mexico is constructed 
around one key question: how do you counter kidnap-
ping when you cannot afford private solutions or rely 
on the state? In a context of impunity and pervasive 
kidnap threat, we are aware that both Mexican citizens 
and irregular migrants are developing self-protection 
strategies and collective resilience to kidnapping. In 
our project, rather than focussing upon collaboration 
with state-actors, we prioritise engagement with such 
activism. Our objectives are to share the knowledge 
and skills that these actors have developed in counter-
kidnapping, as well as to develop a portfolio of new 
resources that can be disseminated more widely across 
Mexican society. Through a structured programme 
of participatory action research workshops, we will 
provide a forum where training can be provided and 
knowledge-exchange fostered. Our activities help 
tailor counter-kidnapping to the needs and expecta-
tions of those most affected by it. Through a process of 
co-producing and co-governing counter-kidnapping 
resources, we focus upon citizen-led intervention to 
assist those at the frontline of kidnapping response.
15 McGlamry, C.G. ‘Kidnappers without borders: 
An epidemic in need of global solutions’ Georgia Journal of 
International Law, 40: 807-832.
or it may be a form of revenge, threat or intimidation, 
a mechanism of extracting labour for the drug-trade 
or sex-trade, or even a mechanism of recruitment into 
cartel activity.
Moreover, there is a temporal dimension to kidnap-
ping that must also be recognized; kidnapping events 
can have different endings (most commonly release, 
disappearance, or death) and victim status may 
therefore evolve. This is manifest in the memorial-
plaques to victims placed at the top of Mexico City’s 
Paseo de la Reforma, some of which read ‘Fui secues-
trado y estoy desaparecido’ (‘I was kidnapped and I 
am disappeared’). To truly understand the problem of 
kidnapping in Mexico, we must also consider the re-
lationship between kidnapping and disappearance. In 
the aforementioned project on Citizen-Led Forensics 
and the disappeared, their independent registry found 
that 38 percent of recorded disappearances began as 
kidnappings. Approached from a different angle, the 
boundaries between extorting smuggled migrants and 
kidnapping them may also be difficult to discern.
Kidnapping cannot, therefore, be researched in 
isolation from other overlapping criminal activities. 
The patterns which these will take, inevitably, vary by 
context. For example, in the case of migrant kidnap-
ping –and also speaking to aforementioned sensation-
alised media coverage– recent attention has focused 
on the linkage between migrant kidnapping and slave 
markets in Libya. We also know little about the micro-
economies that support kidnapping: victims must be 
held captive – housed, fed, secured; negotiations must 
be conducted; ransom payments must be made/trans-
ferred. Kidnapping has its own eco-system and again 
the research around this is limited.
Problems with Existing 
Interventions to Combat 
Kidnapping
It would be wrong to suggest that states, NGOs and 
INGOs have not sought to address kidnapping. For 
example, public outcry in Mexico at this threat’s 
endemic persistence has triggered a sequence of 
national anti-kidnapping initiatives. However, these 
have consistently failed to impact upon this illicit 
practice, some initiatives even being criticized as in-
effective in a context with high levels of impunity, 
where most kidnappers will not face conviction. A 
deeper problem is that if the state –and its actors– are 
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Our research endeavours to highlight how valuable 
avenues to counter-kidnapping exist outside the 
orthodox response channels of state interventions or 
private security actions. To date such initiatives in 
the Mexican context have centred on the emergence 
of activist-citizens, but they may also be detected in 
migrants’ resistance mechanisms to predatory violence 
on migration routes through Mexico (Vogt 2016). 
Recognizing that kidnapping is a threat encountered 
in states of impunity and increasingly parasitic upon 
irregular migrant flows, the following recommenda-
tions for research-informed policy are proposed:
• That kidnapping be recognized as under-re-
searched, and counter-kidnapping as under-re-
sourced, despite this illicit practice’s prevalence, 
notably within smuggling contexts.
• That strategies which make state actors the domi-
nant focus of counter-kidnapping strategies be 
re-evaluated and increased policy attention and 
resources be devoted to micro-strategies of coun-
ter-kidnapping.
• That a forum for comparative exchange on kidnap-
ping as a predatory crime and on human smug-
gling be established to facilitate more empirically 
rich understanding of this illicit practice, as well as 
measures that might prove effective in mitigating 
risk to migrants.
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age –not to mention that because of different diets and 
propensity to chronic malnutrition, the bone composi-
tion of young Indonesian fishermen is likely to be very 
different from that of young Australian people.16 
Since 2011 it has been public knowledge that dozens 
of Indonesian minors have been unlawfully impris-
oned in adult jails in Australia.17 Yet it was not until 
2012 that the Australian government began to give the 
benefit of the doubt to transporters who claimed to be 
minors (Roxon 2013). The Indonesian government has, 
on several occasions, urged Australia to differentiate 
between the fishermen who staff the boats and the or-
ganizers of the people smuggling networks. Moreover, 
it has also criticized the imprisonment of Indonesian 
fishermen and particularly minors, arguing that this 
re-victimizes already disadvantaged and innocent 
children (Missbach 2015). However, when taking a 
closer look at how Indonesia itself has dealt with the 
involvement of underage transporters who have been 
involved in people smuggling, a number of shortcom-
ing and weaknesses in that country’s legal mechanism 
also become obvious.
In Indonesia, people smuggling was classified as 
a crime, starting in May 2011. Under Law 6/2011, 
smuggling carries severe sentences of between five and 
fifteen years in prison as well as fines ranging between 
Rp500 million (US$39,000) and Rp1500 million 
(US$117,000). Since the enactment of this law, dozens 
of people have been prosecuted and sentenced for 
their involvement in people smuggling in Indonesia 
(Missbach 2016). 
Our work has investigated how Indonesian courts 
have dealt with underage smugglers. In particular, 
we examined the case of Hidayah (a pseudonym), a 
young repeat offender who ferried asylum seekers to 
Australia on three occasions but had escaped convic-
tion there. On his fourth attempt Hidayah was arrested 
and sentenced in Indonesia, but his sentence was less 
severe than the minimum prescribed by Law 6/2011, as 
he was still considered a minor. 
16  The reliance on wrist x-ray analysis as evidence 
of maturity appears to have contributed to efforts to obtain 
documentary evidence of age from Indonesia and to the giving 
of limited, if any, weight to such evidence when assessments were 
made of the ages of the young Indonesians. See Australian Human 
Rights Commission, 2012.
17   Currently, there are two trials in which the underage 
Indonesian offenders seek restitution from the Australian 










AND REFUGEES TO 
AUSTRALIA
Wayne Palmer, Department of International 
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Missbach, Monash University.
Worldwide, children and teenagers are recruited for 
activities related to people smuggling. The reasons for 
their recruitment range from the lower cost of their 
labour and their readiness to obey orders to their per-
ception within smuggling operations: since children 
have a low chance of being prosecuted, it is often 
believed that laws are more lenient when they are tried 
for their involvement in smuggling.
Many underage transporters are among those involved 
in the irregular transportation of asylum seekers 
from Indonesia to Australia. They are usually hired 
as deckhands to help with tasks such as operating 
the boat’s engine and preparing food for passengers. 
According to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, between 
September 2008 and September 2013, 1,440 Indone-
sian boat crew members were arrested and sentenced 
for people-smuggling offences in Australia; of these, 
316 were under the age of 18 (Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry 2013). These numbers may not be entirely 
reliable, as the method used most frequently for de-
termining age was the x-raying of a wrist, a technique 
which is far from providing accurate assessments of 
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These are:
• Deception: the minors are often not given correct 
information about the real destination of their 
journey when they are recruited.
• Restricted decision-making: the minors are unable 
to make decisions about matters such as the jour-
ney’s route, the selection of passengers, the prepa-
ration for the journey, etc.
• Inability to object: once at sea, the minors have 
scant opportunities to object. Even if they realise 
they are committing or are expected to commit a 
crime, such as entering Australian territory illegal-
ly, they have no option but to follow instructions.
• False, unpredictable compensation offers: it is 
common for minors not to be paid the compensa-
tion they were initially promised.
Recommendations
Law enforcement and other justice officials in Indonesia 
ought to pay more attention not only to factors such 
as age and age-specific vulnerabilities. More impor-
tantly, when scrutinising people-smuggling cases they 
should start to consider socio-economic disadvantages 
experienced by young Indonesian fishermen during 
their recruitment into criminal activities. Also, the 
minors’ limited power in decision-making before the 
journeys, as well as their overall lack of agency during 
the journeys and of course the unpredictability of com-
pensation need to be considered as part of the judicial 
process. 
By paying closer attention to the recruitment processes 
and the pathways that lead underage fishermen into 
participating in people smuggling, law enforcement 
and other justice officials in Indonesia might be able to 
detect trafficking practices. Becoming more aware of 
the inherent deceptive and exploitative practices used 
within the recruitment and treatment of underage 
fishermen before and during the transportation of 
asylum seekers to Australia would improve minors’ 
access to justice. Recognized as victims of trafficking, 
these underage fishermen would not be convicted for 
people smuggling and would not have to carry the 
main blame for the unsanctioned mobility of asylum 
seekers, but rather they would be entitled to state 
support for their recovery and reintegration, which is 
required by Indonesia’s human trafficking law. 
How and why was Hidayah recruited into people 
smuggling operations? As a teenager who had quit 
school as he had to find work in order to financially 
support his family, he was more open to accepting job 
offers that promised unusually high compensation. 
When recruited as a transporter to bring asylum seekers 
to Australia, Hidayah was promised by the recruiter 
that he would be paid at the time of departure, rather 
than upon arrival in Australia. Hidayah had insisted 
on this condition, not only because his payments 
during his previous trips had not come through in full. 
However, despite his insistence on a timely payment, 
the organizers deferred his payment. Hidayah had no 
opportunity to protest this change or to withdraw from 
the job. 
Our research indicates that underage people smugglers 
are more vulnerable to exploitation in people-smug-
gling operations because of their age and are thus often 
not positioned to object. Our examination of Hidayah’s 
case points to the judicial system’s inability to under-
stand the deception inherent in recruiting minors for 
these smuggling operations. In some cases, their re-
cruitment and treatment during the people-smuggling 
journeys equates to trafficking. Criminal investigators 
and courts give very little consideration to the possi-
bility that the minors arrested for people smuggling 
might have been trafficked themselves. In fact, because 
of their repeated involvement in smuggling opera-
tions, Indonesian courts dismissed the possibility that 
the transporters may be victims of trafficking, ruling 
instead that, despite their young age, they should 
have known from their previous encounters with law 
enforcement agents that they were acting illegally, as 
was argued in Hidayah’s case. His high vulnerability 
to recruitment into illegal activities resulting from his 
family’s poverty was ignored by law enforcement.
Under political pressure to show their commitment 
to combatting people smuggling, Indonesian law en-
forcement and justice officials must show results in the 
arrest and prosecution of smugglers. Having studied 
closely a number of trials and court documentation, our 
research indicates that there is an inherent tendency to 
seek punishment for people smuggling rather than for 
related crimes, simply because the evidentiary require-
ments for people smuggling are easier to meet than, for 
example, those for proving human trafficking.
Our research defines the employment of underage 
Indonesian males in smuggling as exploitative on the 
basis of four factors. 
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In early 2019, three specific stories about women and 
migration were commonly seen online. Re-tweeted 
consistently were a New York Times report over the 
sexual violence faced by migrant women in transit 
from Mexico into the United States; the gruesome 
images on the treatment of migrants being held in 
detention centers in Libya –consistently labeled in 
Europe as a case of ‘slavery’ following a sensationalistic 
and graphic CNN report in late 2017;  and Al-Jazeera’s 
coverage on women from Niger who, following the 
EU-crackdown on smuggling facilitators and having 
worked themselves in what was depicted as the once 
profitable world of smuggling, had found themselves 
again subdued to men. 
All three stories matter, for they are indeed reflec-
tive of the widespread concerns among European and 
American audiences over the perceived challenges 
women from the global south face in the context of 
migration. They also, however, constitute yet another 
round of repetitive, palatable stories reducing women’s 
experiences on the migration pathway to sex, suffering 
and subjugation.  But is there room for a more 
complex narrative concerning women to emerge? 
The stories reminded me of the rich ethnographic 
work of scholars like Wendy Vogt, Noelle Brigden, 
Lupe Flores, Robin Reineke and Soledad Alvarez 
Velasco, whose work has documented the intimate and 
personal nature of the experiences of women in relation 
to migration. My own work documents both the expe-
riences of women who have been convicted of migrant 
smuggling in the US and those who in the context of 
their migratory journeys perform smuggling-related 
tasks. These nuanced approaches have hardly been part 
of the conversation surrounding the alleged migration 
crises worldwide, or specifically those purportedly 
taking place on the US Mexico border. In fact, despite 
the ubiquity of references to smugglers and traffick-
ers in the often racist discourse coming out of the US 
White House, empirical research and data on the facili-
tation of migration continues to be scant.  
Why have the experiences of women remained largely 
invisible in this conversation? The answer may be 
connected to the dominant narratives counter-smug-
gling enforcement relies upon worldwide –those where 
smuggling facilitation is portrayed as the domain of 
dark-skinned male smugglers operating in Africa, 
Mexico or the Middle East—but also to the stories 
we as audiences like to tell ourselves. Smuggling has 
historically been described as a criminal and obscure 
domain in which men from the global south organized 
in vast criminal networks extract financial profits 
from a seemingly unstoppable number of desperate 
people. Within this framework references to women 
are limited to the kind that portray them as victims of 
men’s sexual impulses, or as their devious partners in 
an evil human trade.
The forms of violence migrant women face –and 
inflict—on the migration pathway must not be ignored. 
Yet to attribute them solely to ‘smugglers’ or organized 
crime masks the vast range of actors –including the 
state –playing a role in the execution of such violence. 
Furthermore, the focus on sexual violence leads to the 
fetishization of the bodies of migrant women of color, 
obscuring the very strategies they deploy for their 
protection and that of those who travel with them, 
and the relationships that they may forge along the 
way for survival, company and care (Brigden 2018; 
Vogt, 2019). Furthermore, conceiving the facilita-
tion of irregular migration as being solely under the 
control of an organized criminal element hides the 
many actors who facilitate mobility (friends, family 
members, indigenous communities, seasonal or inci-
dental passeurs) who, despite lacking criminal inten-
tions, have become increasingly criminalized (Stone-
Cadena and Alvarez Velasco, 2018; Guevara Gonzalez, 
2018; Kook, this volume).    
The examination of women’s experiences with 
smuggling facilitators, but also as facilitators them-
selves, further reduces the need to rely on the victim/
predator binary often present in smuggling narratives. 
It reveals complex, if certainly often unequal interac-
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family members, male and female, who have already 
participated in smuggling activities. Other women 
reported having independently approached people 
known to be involved in smuggling seeking an em-
ployment opportunity. Others were migrants them-
selves who, having been unable to complete their fees, 
agreed to pay them off through the performance of 
varying tasks. 
 The circles the women interacted with were comprised 
of people like themselves living in communities along 
the migrant trail. Despite the common allegations in 
the media of a convergence between different criminal 
markets, there was no indication that any of the women 
had ties to transnational criminal organizations. Some 
did report interactions with other men and women 
involved in drug trafficking activities, yet the nature 
of such encounters varied widely. It ranged from 
warnings against the use of specific routes to having 
to pay fees or piso for the right to travel through them, 
and from sharing food and water while en route to 
running into each other at schools, churches, markets 
and parties. In short, there was no conclusive evidence 
of structural convergence between migrant smuggling 
and any other crimes.  
What are women’s experiences 
in smuggling like?
Many women perform smuggling-related tasks in 
the context of their migratory journeys. As described 
above, some were offered discounts on their smuggling 
fees or improved travel conditions for themselves and/
or those they traveled with (their children, spouses) in 
exchange for work. Among the tasks women consist-
ently performed were cooking, cleaning, and caring 
for children and elderly migrants. Many of the women 
who were already settled reported being compensated 
for assisting recently-arrived migrants secure medical 
attention, clothing, furniture, information on schools, 
housing and employment. Others housed migrants 
during specific segments of their journeys, and on 
occasion enlisted the assistance of other women, espe-
cially when hosting several migrants simultaneously. 
While it is quite likely that the shame or stigma might 
have prevented the disclosure of these cases, none of 
the women I have interviewed to date have reported 
having experienced sexual assault. All of them, however, 
endured often heinous forms of sexual intimidation 
and harassment at the hands of male smuggling facili-
tions that vary in context, duration and nature. Data 
reflects that the tasks women perform in smuggling are 
key to their survival and that of other people in transit 
and that to do so often involves not just violence, but 
also the crafting and deployment of forms of protection 
and care in economic and socially-precarious settings. 
Who are the women in 
smuggling?
While the following must not be interpreted as re-
flective of the experiences of all women, there are a 
few generalizations that can be made on the basis of 
research and data concerning women in smuggling. 
The United States, through the US Sentencing Com-
mission (USSC) is one of the few countries in the 
world that makes data on smuggling convictions 
available. This shows that out of the 2,400 people who 
on average have been convicted for smuggling offenses 
at the federal level since 2011, about 25 percent (that is, 
approximately 600 of them) have been women. 
 Their ages vary widely –official data only provides 
numbers involving adult women, but I have also in-
terviewed women who indicated their involvement 
started prior to them turning 18 (Sanchez 2018; DHIA 
this issue). While the statistics from the USSC indicate 
the number of US citizens convicted of smuggling 
at the federal level is increasing, most women I have 
interviewed for the purpose of my research have 
been undocumented migrants from Mexico and 
Central America. Few of them spoke English. Some 
had received no formal education, while others had 
attended few years of elementary school; others had 
completed trade school courses in their countries of 
origin. But what they systematically had in common 
was the fact that they all lived in low-income, working 
class communities throughout the United States and 
on the US Mexico border, and were employed or un-
deremployed –in addition to performing smuggling 
tasks—in low-wage jobs, such as fast-food cooks, 
maids, nannies and janitors. Two were hairdressers. 
The vast majority were mothers to US born children. 
Women’s entry into criminal markets is often explained 
in the criminological literature as dependent upon 
their romantic involvement with men who are almost 
invariably portrayed as occupying positions of power. 
Testimonies of women convicted for smuggling reveal 
that while that is occasionally the case, participation is 
often the result of social obligations towards friends or 
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tators, other migrants in transit, and law enforcement 
and other state officials in both Mexico and the United 
States. Many witnessed or heard of women who had 
been victims of sex crimes. But women also learned, 
found and developed ways to resist and challenge these 
incidents, both by themselves and with the help of 
other women and men. Several acknowledged having 
willingly forged close and in some cases intimate rela-
tionships during their journeys with smuggling facili-
tators and other migrants, for protection and expedited 
transit, but did not characterize them as forced interac-
tions or as constituting sexual assault.  
The legal ramifications of 
women’s participation in 
smuggling
Data indicates that women’s participation in the facili-
tation of irregular migration has less than nefarious 
motives. It emerges from individual decisions to 
improve personal living conditions, and is indicative 
of the ways women navigate the precarity arising from 
gender, class and race-based inequalities. Participation 
is primarily motivated by hopes of material gain, but 
also by different reasons and goals– ranging from the 
desire to supplement low wages from low-paying oc-
cupations, to reducing the financial and/or physical 
impact of their own irregular journeys. 
When undocumented migrant women are convicted 
for smuggling, their status leads to their deporta-
tion following the completion of their incarceration 
sentence. This in turn invariably results in family sepa-
ration. Furthermore, a felony conviction of the kind 
resulting from smuggling charges eliminates the pos-
sibility of women being allowed to re-enter the country 
legally in the future. Interviewed women who were 
prosecuted in the US often opted to leave their children 
under the care of other women or older relatives in the 
US, for they believed this would provide the children 
with better opportunities than those available in the 
mother’s country of origin.  
Smuggling criminalization also has other impacts on 
the women’s children. These are often subjected to sur-
veillance and intimidation themselves. Legal records 
provide abundant evidence of this kind of policing 
behavior. In one case, police placed a woman’s young 
daughter under watch, stopping her one day on her 
way from school and confiscating her maths notebooks 
claiming the numbers it contained were evidence of 
the family’s involvement in smuggling. Another case 
outlined how police had placed two young children 
under house arrest, threatening their mother with 
removing them unless she confessed to a smuggling 
charge.  
Among the women who participate in smuggling as a 
way to pay off the remainder of their smuggling fees, 
detection by law enforcement was a constant fear. 
Arrests almost invariably result in the confiscation of 
any smuggling fees already paid as evidence –funds 
that are often borrowed by migrants and their families 
at high interest rates.  Hoping that their silence will be 
rewarded with additional border crossing attempts, 
many migrants refuse to disclose the identity of 
predatory smuggling facilitators. Other cases lead to 
criminal charges being filed against migrants them-
selves. One of the cases I examined involved that of 
a pregnant woman who was charged with aggravated 
smuggling, despite evidence that she was working in 
indentured-like conditions with the hope of eventually 
being transported to her destination. 
Recommendations
• The roles and motivations of women who perform 
smuggling-related tasks are varied and complex. 
Yet their backgrounds are primarily the same: they 
are low income residents of marginalized commu-
nities along the migrant pathway, who are often 
undocumented migrants with limited mechanisms 
to improve social or economic mobility. Their ex-
periences show enforcement measures to counter 
smuggling do not impact transnational organized 
crime but rather poor, often marginalized people 
who rely on smuggling facilitation as an income 
generating mechanism and at times as a path to 
migration. Operations chasing the myth of the or-
ganized smuggling ring have scant if any impact 
on the overall smuggling market, its more predato-
ry forms and their often dangerous ramifications. 
• Relief from deportation for the mothers charged 
with smuggling can reduce to some degree the 
impact of criminalization, as well as the establish-
ment of policies regulating contacts with women’s 
children in the context of an investigation. 
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• Policies concerning the reimbursement of confis-
cated smuggling fees may also reduce the long-
term vulnerability of migrants who, regardless of 
the outcome of their journeys, are still responsible 
for the debt accrued. 
Exploring the implications of smuggling’s practices and 
its enforcement on women opens doors to the possibil-
ity of creating improved mechanisms for the adminis-
tration of justice and for victims’ access to protection. 
Enforcement practices but also sensationalistic stories 
that perpetuate the myths surrounding the smuggling 
market on the other hand just allow for the continued 
victimization of people who have been intentionally 
silenced for too long. 
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Derechos Humanos Integrales en Acción (DHIA, 
A.C.) – Ciudad Juárez, México
Introduction
Migrant smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border has 
generated much discussion in policy, academic and 
law enforcement circles, particularly under the current 
U.S. administration. Yet there is scant empirical and 
grounded research on its dynamics, actors, and human 
security implications. In this essay we provide an 
overview of a community intervention carried out in 
El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico (both cities 
on neighbouring sides of the U.S. Mexico border) on 
the experiences of boys, girls and adolescents working 
in the facilitation of smuggling journeys. We argue 
that the often-monolithic representation of smuggling 
as a crime carried out by cartels or transnationally 
organized criminal networks obscures the dynamics 
of the communities where smuggling takes place, and 
the risks faced by actors involved in smuggling, which 
along the U.S.-Mexico border include historically mar-
ginalized children and youth.
Context
Even though current border and migration enforce-
ment discourses in both Mexico and the United States 
often characterize it as an unprecedented phenome-
non, migrant smuggling along the U.S.-Mexico border 
is not new. Throughout history it has been tied to sys-
tematic restrictions imposed on the mobility of specific 
groups of people, often on the basis of ethnicity and/
18  This research was supported in part by the Fund for 
Research Excellence at the University of Texas. The full text of the 
report can be found at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/50984
or citizenship.19 For decades, coyotes –the colloquial 
term used in reference to migrant smuggling facilita-
tors–have been known to assist employers as well as 
migrants from across Latin America to overcome legal 
restrictions and physical barriers preventing them from 
entering the United States.20 Increased border enforce-
ment and militarization on both sides of the border, 
changing migration trends and national security 
practices, along with growing inequalities in Central 
America and Mexico, have also led to the emergence 
and consolidation of Mexico as an important migrant 
smuggling corridor, where migrants have increasingly 
become the target of acts of violence and victimization. 
The ill-treatment irregular migrants in transit face 
when traveling through Mexico has been extensively 
documented. Tens of thousands of migrants have been 
reported dead or missing during their journeys along 
the U.S.-Mexico migratory corridor, while kidnapping, 
extortion, sexual assault and torture are common-
place.21 These crimes are carried out by a constellation 
of actors, ranging from criminal groups and smugglers 
themselves to migration enforcement officials, police 
agents, military forces and ordinary citizens.22 
Over the last decade multiple reports have depicted 
the smuggling market along the US Mexico border as 
a sophisticated operation performed by hierarchically 
organized criminal groups, particularly Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations (DTOs). While the claim is 
ubiquitous,23 it draws from limited empirical research. 
19  See Chao Romero, Robert (2010). The Chinese in 
Mexico 1882-1940. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Spener, 
David (2009) Clandestine crossings: migrants and coyotes on the 
Texas-Mexico Border. New York: Cornell University Press. 
20  See Gamio, Manuel (1971). Mexican Immigration to 
the United States: A study of human migration and adjustment. 
Mineola: Dover Publications. 
21  See Leutert and Yates, this issue.
22  Sanchez, Gabriella and Sheldon Zhang (2018). ‘Rumors, 
encounters, collaborations and survival: the migrant smuggling-
drug trafficking nexus in the US Southwest.’ The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 676(1): 135-
151.
23  For examples, see Leutert, Stephanie (2017). ‘When 
Drug Trafficking is your only option.’ Foreign Policy. 14 July 
2017. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/14/when-
drug-trafficking-is-your-only-option; Slack, Jeremy and Howard 
Campbell (2016) “On narco-coyotaje: illicit regimes and their 
impacts on the US Mexico Border.” Antipode, 48(5); 1381-1399; 
Correa-Cabrera, Guadalupe (2017). Trafficking in Persons along 
Mexico’s Eastern Migration Routes. Washington DC: Wilson 
Center Latin American Program.
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Most of the data used has been collected in shelters 
among migrants who have been victims of violence, or 
is derived from statements from law enforcement or 
migration authorities, whose actions have consistently 
come into question among extensively documented 
claims of corruption and extortion.  
The claim has also become increasingly questioned 
by recent ethnographic work on smuggling dynamics. 
For example, knowledge of migration routes and travel 
techniques to avoid law enforcement detection is 
indeed a valuable and profitable skill amid stepped-up 
immigration enforcement. This knowledge, however, is 
far from being solely under the control or administra-
tion of large organizations or networks.24  Instead, it is 
most often held and mobilized by those who live along 
the migration trail and understand its challenges. 
Frequently, those behind the journeys of migrant are 
migrants themselves who became stranded at some 
point during their own transits, and who profit on the 
expertise they have acquired in the process of crossing 
borders to make a living. Many others are knowledge-
able about crossing paths and hiding places by virtue 
of living along the migration pathway, and are able to 
profit from that knowledge. 
This is indeed the case of the children whose experi-
ences we document here. They are residents of some 
of the most marginalized communities along the US 
Mexico borderlands, their neighbourhoods consist-
ently ranking among those with the highest rates of 
poverty in national surveys on both sides of the border. 
For generations these communities –known as colonias 
--have endured low educational and employment op-
portunities, and limited access to medical care, water, 
electricity, sewage and public transportation. Their 
residents are also more likely to present higher rates 
of substance abuse, malnutrition and exposure to toxic 
chemicals than those residing elsewhere. Ironically, 
these communities are also situated along strategic 
points to access the United States undetected, and con-
stitute for that reason prime territory for contraband 
activities. In this context, participation in illicit and/
or criminal activities is often seen as a mechanism 
to counter the impact of poverty. Many of those who 
participate in these activities –which include migrant 
smuggling -- are children.
24  See Campana, this issue; Sanchez, Gabriella (2018). Five 
misconceptions about migrant smuggling. Policy Brief. Florence: 
Migration Policy Centre. Available from: http://cadmus.eui.eu//
handle/1814/54964.
“Circuit Children”
In Mexican protection circles the term niñez de circuito 
(‘circuit children’) is used to designate the boys, girls 
and adolescents within the ages of 11 and 17 who re-
currently perform drug and migrant smuggling tasks 
along the U.S.-Mexico border.  While drug and migrant 
smuggling are considered criminal offenses under U.S. 
and Mexican law, children do not face criminal charges 
as a result of their involvement in the markets given 
their age. If apprehended in the context of these activi-
ties binational agreements establish that the children 
must be returned by U.S. authorities to Mexican au-
thorities, who must then release the children to their 
parents or mentors.
It is common to hear claims that criminal organiza-
tions and/or drug trafficking groups (cartels) are aware 
of this legal gap, and forcibly recruit the children to 
perform tasks for them. While this may indeed be the 
experience of some children along the border, those in-
terviewed as part of our study entered the market as a 
result of their personal awareness of the financial and 
social benefits derived from participating in illicit and/
or criminal markets. Most children are recruited by 
peers, friends and even family members with no ties to 
organized crime, who participate in smuggling to sup-
plement precarious wages from jobs in the mainstream 
economy. Most children reported not having faced 
coercion or violence at the time of their recruitment. 
Participation in smuggling becomes instead normal-
ized as a viable if not ideal form of labour, especially 
given the systemic lack of employment and education-
al opportunities on the border region. The children’s 
knowledge of the border’s geography becomes a skill 
they can market and profit from without having to 
leave their communities.25 
The income generated through smuggling constitutes 
an important reason behind children’s involvement in 
the market. As guides, children are paid a commission 
for every migrant they are able to cross successfully, 
and receive additional compensation if the person 
is from a country other than Mexico. The children 
are aware of and often proudly reflect on the impact 
their income has on their family’s quality of life. One 
teenage boy stated: “with the money I got I bought 
shoes for all my little siblings; I would take everybody 
25  All 454 circuit children identified in 2016-2017 by 
Ciudad Juarez’s child protection authorities were residents of 4 
hard-to-access neighborhoods in the immediate proximity of the 
border fence.   
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out for pizza.” But the reasons they cite for participat-
ing in smuggling often go beyond profit. The children 
express a desire to help others amid the criminaliza-
tion and enforcement of migration. A teenage girl who 
worked as a decoy stated: “it is nice to know you help 
[migrants] reunite with their family, especially now 
that it is harder to cross.” Aware of the risks inherent to 
irregular migration, on occasion the children reported 
assisting migrants they perceive as vulnerable or at 
risk. A teenage boy who worked as a driver stated: “I 
always got women and girls out of the safe houses26 first 
because they reminded me of my mom and my sisters 
and I didn’t want them to suffer.” The testimonies of 
the children, most of whom are male, also reflect their 
aspirations for social recognition. Statements like “my 
boss really liked me, he said I was a good worker;” “I 
was good at what I did; I liked taking risks and knew 
more than the other guides and that’s why they kept 
me” were common during our fieldwork.  
The Implications 
The children may not specifically describe the work 
they perform in smuggling as precarious, forced 
or violent. Yet their testimonies reveal smuggling’s 
high levels of risk. They often work at night guiding 
migrants through rough or dangerous terrain to avoid 
detection. A child reported having almost drowned 
while attempting to cross the canal between the cities 
of El Paso and Juarez (“my partner pulled me from the 
collar of my shirt, otherwise the current would have 
dragged me”). They also operate heavy equipment or 
tools, which often results in injuries. 
Much has been said about the violence children can 
face as a result of working for organized crime. Yet it 
appears their vulnerability is compounded by their 
condition as young people in precarious work environ-
ments, rather than by the actions of criminal groups. 
One child described being brought blindfolded to a 
location where his employer –a teenager only one or 
two years older than him and who claimed to have ties 
to drug trafficking—unleashed a fight dog onto him 
as punishment for requesting a day-off from work. 
Another child shared that his own father forced him to 
remain in the market as a guide, which eventually led 
the child to run away from home and file an asylum 
claim in the U.S. The desire to improve their financial 
situation also leads the children to endure mistreat-
26  Locations where migrants wait for transportation 
services or while their fees are being paid and/or negotiated.
ment and violence. Despite disliking the job, one of the 
children could not find an occupation that paid as well 
as smuggling or that allowed him to support his family. 
While he had left the job voluntarily, he returned after 
a brief hiatus to work for a man he described as an 
abusive employer: “I took a job bagging groceries but 
I made virtually no money, and by then my girlfriend 
had had a baby so I just had to go back. I had no other 
option.”
Children’s interactions with law enforcement are also 
source of continued tension. In 2014, U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (US CBP) implemented the 
Juvenile Referral Program, which involved the iden-
tification and holding of “alien minors suspected of 
smuggling.”27 Under the claim  that “criminal organiza-
tions used unaccompanied alien children from Mexico 
to smuggle aliens and narcotics,”28 USCPB brought an 
estimated 800 children into custody. Identified on the 
basis of criminal and biometric records as recurrent 
smugglers, the children were subjected to question-
ing by US CBP and other law enforcement agencies 
without legal counsel or parental authorization. During 
this time children were placed in juvenile detention fa-
cilities in locations across the United States, often away 
from their neighborhoods on the U.S. Mexico border. 
This resulted in families not being able to contact or 
visit their children, or simply know their whereabouts. 
Our research indicated parents were often not notified 
of their children’s apprehension. One mother stated she 
did not hear from her son in 6 months, while another 
stated it was 3 months before her son was allowed to 
communicate with her. While the program officially 
terminated in 2015, children continue to report that 
they were subjected to intensive questioning and in-
timidation by U.S. immigration enforcement agents. 
Furthermore, there are also reports of children being 
returned to Mexico even in cases when they have 
reported fearing for their personal safety and that of 
their family. Children also report being questioned in 
plain sight, being denied food or medical attention, 
and being placed in holding cells with very low tem-
peratures. 
27  American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
(ACLU) vs. US DHS, US CBP, US ICE, USCIS, DHHS, ORR 
(2017).  Opinion. (US, March 22, 2017) Case no. 1:15-cv-
09020-RWS. Available from: https://www.courthousenews. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CBP-FOIA.pdf
28  See ACLU, above.
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Recommendations
Boys, girls and adolescents in smuggling activities 
along the U.S.-Mexico border face specific challenges, 
which have been obscured by the emphasis on fighting 
smuggling primarily as a transnational organized 
crime. U.S. immigration authorities have repeatedly 
argued the children, despite their age, are willing actors 
within smuggling networks and that they ought to be 
prosecuted, while Mexican authorities lack long-term 
strategies that may reduce children’s involvement in the 
market. Our research found structural marginaliza-
tion on both sides of the border creates the conditions 
that lead families and children and youth to resort to 
criminalized activities as subsistence mechanisms –in 
other words, despite the fact that smuggling is known 
to be an illicit activity, children and their families often 
see it as a legitimate form of labour amid the lack of 
other employment or occupational opportunities. As 
long as policy and practice continue not to include the 
perspectives of the communities where activities like 
smuggling takes place or to address their challenges, 
the often-devastating consequences of children’s par-
ticipation in smuggling are likely to continue.
At the same time, as researchers and border residents, 
we understand that the conditions within border com-
munities are unlikely to change overnight. Yet we 
provide a series of specific recommendations that can 
be carried out to reduce the vulnerability of children 
in smuggling: 
• Law enforcement’s contacts with children must be 
performed in a fashion that ensures the protection 
and the respect of their privacy, identity and well-
being. Interactions must be in the language of the 
child and non-antagonistic in nature.        
• Children must be allowed to communicate with a 
trusted family member or adult immediately fol-
lowing their contact with any authority, particu-
larly if apprehension or detention is expected. If 
no adult is available, a special advocate must be 
appointed.
• If criminal charges are filed, the children and their 
family must also be given appropriate notice and 
support, including access to counsel. 
• Binational protocols outlining the responsibilities 
of the authorities to the children on both sides of 
the border must be developed and enforced. 
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In this regard, a look into ISIS internal documents 
allows us to shed light on the purported intersections 
with smuggling networks and, eventually, debunk the 
thesis of an organic connection. The available evidence 
shows indeed that ISIS never systematically used 
migrant smugglers to fund its insurgency or move 
affiliates across borders. I argue that this occurs as a 
result of structural and operational differences, which 
relate to opposing rationales. Before entering into 
that discussion, a few considerations on ISIS political 
economy and facilitation schemes are in order. 
The Islamic State revenue 
generation and facilitation 
network   
ISIS financial and personnel records, retrieved by US 
Special Forces or provided by defectors, reveal the 
fingerprints of the Islamist group. ISIS is the best-
funded terrorist organization worldwide due to a di-
versified mechanism of revenue generation, which re-
portedly managed to generate $1-3 million per day in 
late 2014 (Johnston & al. 2016: 255) and thrives on a 
wide array of criminal practices – oil and natural gas 
smuggling, bank looting, extortion, and kidnapping 
for ransom to mention a few (CAT 2015). Despite 
imposing taxes on trade and border crossing, the or-
ganization has not taken up the smuggling of migrants 
as a means of financing. This is not by chance: since 
its inception, ISIS has followed the criteria of looting 
resources and taxing licit and illicit economies in order 
to be financially independent. The approach vis-à-vis 
human smuggling is rooted in its organizational 
culture, military imperatives, and also in the power 
vacuum opened by the collapse of the Ba’athist regime 
in Iraq and mounting civil strife in Syria. Even though 
militants have levied fees on smuggling routes in areas 
under de-facto jurisdiction (Humud & al. 2015: 9), or 
at least did so while they maintained territorial control, 
that share is marginal in the ISIS criminal economy. 
Rather, taxation performs a political function for the 
insurgent group, namely acquiring legitimacy and 
social control by acting as a state-like authority.
Similarly, ISIS has not outsourced its logistics to 
external facilitators. Data on the transit of foreign 
fighters details a peculiar modus operandi with a 
limited number of key crossing points on the Tur-
key-Syria border managed by military command-
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With Syria descending into a brutal civil war and 
the outbreak of the Islamic State (ISIS29), since 2011 
millions of Syrians and Iraqis have been displaced 
or forced to leave their home country. The influx of 
refugees and asylum seekers fleeing from conflict has 
created a state of anxiety in Europe. Amid the parallel 
increase of terrorist attacks in European countries, 
alleged connections between terrorist fighters and 
irregular migrants are frequently represented in con-
temporary narratives of the “refugee crisis”. Smuggling 
networks are thought to be readily available to terrorist 
organizations such as Al-Qaida and ISIS to finance 
their operations and infiltrate fighters below the radar 
of security apparatuses. 
However, though commonplace in the public 
discourse, such a nexus is based on anecdotal informa-
tion only. Europol has not found evidence that migrant 
smuggling is a source of revenue for terrorist organi-
zations (Europol 2016a: 12). Despite there being only 
a few isolated cases, the EU law enforcement agency 
also stated that foreign fighters “typically do not rely on 
the facilitation services offered by migrant smuggling 
networks” (see also Interpol & Europol 2016). 
29 The acronym stands for “Islamic State in Iraq and al-
Sham” and it is preferred here to IS (“Islamic State”) because the 
study focuses on the militia that rose from the ashes of Al-Qaida in 
Iraq and established itself over a contiguous area across Syria and 
Iraq, while the latter denomination has a global reach including 
under the umbrella of the Caliphate, a variety of branches and 
affiliated groups that may follow different organizational models.   
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war conditions and the need for a constant supply of 
foreign fighters led the organization to build its own 
infrastructure to move fighters, weapons, and money. 
As a further illustration of that, ISIS forces took over 
villages and towns on the Turkish southern border to 
secure safe passages for foreign recruits. 
This also applies to those moving out of the ISIS-held 
territories after fighting for the Caliphate. Although 
very few foreign fighters have engaged in acts of 
terrorism upon returning back to their home countries 
–only 1 in 360 returnees according to Hegghammer 
& Nesser (2015)—most of them used legal channels 
–mainly flight connections from Turkey (Europol 
2016b) –or the organization’s transnational network. It 
should also be noted that jihadist attacks in the West 
are predominantly “lone wolf ” attacks, executed by 
self-radicalized Western nationals without previous 
fighting experience and not directed by any jihadist 
group.  
Not the flip side of the 
same coin 
If smuggling networks and terrorist groups such as 
ISIS neither coincide nor overlap, I argue that a crucial 
reason for that lies in their opposite organizational 
models. Being an armed militia, ISIS follows a hier-
archical, vertically integrated, and highly specialized 
structure. These characteristics cannot be attributed 
to smuggling networks. Recent research has shown 
indeed that these are not sophisticated criminal cartels, 
but rather flexible and loosely connected groups in 
which the division of labor does not translate into rigid 
hierarchies (Achilli, 2016). As other contributors to 
this publication clearly point out, smuggling networks 
tend to be horizontal, structured on an ad-hoc basis, 
and also relatively accessible. 
Most importantly, these organizational differenc-
es underline contrasting purposes. Whereas ISIS is 
geared to sustaining warfare and mimicking state-like 
functions, human smugglers provide a mechanism 
of protection to people seeking safety and who are 
unable to leave conflict zones. Critical research on 
smuggling has stressed that these mechanisms “are 
often community initiated” and “constitute a form of 
human security from below” (Sanchez 2017: 20). The 
siege of Mosul is a case in point. Long a stronghold of 
the Caliphate, militants deterred people from fleeing 
with public executions and landmines all around its 
perimeter since out-migration was detrimental to ISIS 
legitimacy. On the other side, smugglers took high 
risks to help civilians leave the city.  
This puts into question the mainstream depiction of 
smugglers as ruthless and exclusively profit-driven 
exploiters: kinship and solidarity are powerful motiva-
tions as much as material gains. It also draws attention 
to the fact that smuggling processes originate as a 
coping strategy to overcome restrictions to mobility 
and the lack of international assistance, which in the 
first place created the conditions for clandestine alter-
natives.  
Policy implications 
Especially after 9/11, irregular migration and inter-
national terrorism have been viewed as interrelated 
threats, making migration policies more restrictive 
on the grounds of security concerns. The assump-
tion behind this is that the smuggling of migrants is a 
lucrative and murky business which naturally attracts 
terrorist organizations. However, this general under-
standing is not empirically supported. 
Putting smugglers on the same level as terrorist fighters 
is not only analytically misguided, but also produces 
unhelpful policies. Deconstructing such a connection 
has therefore relevant implications. First, targeting 
migrant smugglers does not degrade terrorist organi-
zations neither financially, nor logistically. Second, 
linking the occurrence of terrorist violence in Europe 
with migration flows is deeply flawed. Rather, since 
terrorism is a driver of migration (Schmid 2016), we 
should be asking whether stricter border management 
prevents or increases violence by forcing refugees and 
asylum seekers to leave themselves to the mercy of 
unsafe journeys. 
From this perspective the criminalization of smugglers, 
as well as the militarization of borders, do nothing but 
increase the vulnerability of irregular migrants without 
crafting effective responses. Even more dangerously, 
it spreads resentment against migrant communities 
settled in Europe. These considerations recommend 
decoupling counter-terrorism and migration policies, 
and in the latter case placing more emphasis on the 
risks that migrants face during border crossings. 
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Europol launched the European Migrant Smuggling 
Center to “proactively support EU Member States in 
dismantling criminal networks involved in organizing 
migrant smuggling.”30 The U.S. government follows 
the same response strategy—stepping up efforts to 
combat criminal smuggling organizations to reduce 
illegal entries by foreign nationals.31 Along the same 
lines, major international organizations such as the 
United Nations also advocate positions that aim at 
improving legislative development and cooperation 
among member states to combat what is considered a 
multibillion-dollar global criminal enterprise.32 
The response strategy seems uniform across the global 
north—combatting smuggling organizations is key to 
reducing the influx of unwanted immigrants. News 
media seem to support such a policy discourse. Not 
a single week passes by without stories of migrants 
rescued off open seas, rickety boats capsized, dead 
bodies floating in the Mediterranean Sea, or Mexican 
migrants dying in the hands of “kingpin smugglers 
with blatant disregard for human life” (Beavers 2017). 
This binary predator-victim position saturates much 
of the official discourse on illegal migration, and has 
remained largely unchallenged in the West for many 
years. It claims migrant smugglers are major enablers 
of illegal transnational migration and the main 
cause of abuse and violence experienced by migrants 
worldwide. 
Crimes of Solidarity in 
Mobility
Field researchers such as those included in this series 
have time and again found evidence contrary to the 
mainstream official narrative. Migrants are not passive 
actors in transnational migration but active in vetting 
and procuring smuggling services (see Achilli, this 
volume), evaluating the reliability of smuggling fa-
30  Detailed information about this center can 
be found at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/ 
EMSC_launch. 
31  The lead federal agency in charge of combatting migrant 
smuggling is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
under the Homeland Security. For details of the U.S. official 
counter-smuggling strategies, see https://www.ice.gov/human-
smuggling.  
32  An example of the official assessment and counter 
measures advocated by the United Nations Office on Drug and 
Crime (UNODC) can be found at: https://www.unodc.org/toc/en/
crimes/migrant-smuggling.html. 
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The “Crisis” of Irregular 
Migration in the (Western) 
World
The Western world has in recent years been screaming 
alarm at the massive influx of migrants, mostly 
unwanted because of their unfortunate origins from 
the underprivileged global south. What is more inter-
esting is that by most government accounts, criminal 
networks are responsible for much of  irregular 
migration, placing migrants in circumstances replete 
with abuses and exploitation. The official narrative is 
rather simple to present. It is often reduced to (1) the 
brutality of the criminal networks, and (2) the vul-
nerability of naïve migrants caught in an unfortunate 
journey. For instance, Europol claimed that ninety 
percent of the one million migrants who reached the 
EU in 2015 had been assisted by criminal networks as 
well as individual criminal entrepreneurs (2016). 
Western governments largely consider combatting 
migrant smuggling activities an important, if not the 
most important, aspect in its efforts to stem the flow 
of illegal migrants. For instance, in February 2016, 
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often blend into their ethnic communities to settle in 
transit countries, thus unwittingly strengthening the 
infrastructure of these way stations. As most of us field 
researchers who have spent much time mingling with 
migrants and smugglers in different parts of the world 
can attest, the vast majority of migrants remain unde-
feated in spirit and will find ways to make money and 
connections for future attempts. Many of them become 
smugglers themselves while others choose to provide 
support services such as food and shelter to other 
travellers in transit countries (see Kook, this volume; 
Achilli, this volume).
Questions Too Obvious to 
Ignore
A few themes have remained unchanged for decades in 
irregular migration: (1) there appears to be no shortage 
of attempts by migrants from the global south to travel 
to the north; (2) increased efforts from the global north 
to erect barriers through border hardening and crimi-
nalizing irregular migration and imposing harsh pun-
ishment on migration facilitators; and (3) intensified 
information campaigns to demonize migration facili-
tators and to employ scare tactics to dissuade would-be 
migrants. 
The persistent demand for smuggling services in 
transnational irregular migration begs the question 
of why migrants fail to heed the warnings from gov-
ernment agencies and continue to seek out smugglers, 
seemingly oblivious of the dangers awaiting them. 
Why do so many migrants continue to place their lives 
and large amounts of money into the hands of their 
migration handlers?
The response seems equally obvious: unwavering aspi-
ration for upward mobility in the face of blocked op-
portunities. In a globalized economy, images of good 
living through material goods have crossed all geo-
graphical and cultural boundaries. Internet and mobile 
electronics accelerate the spread of information about 
living and working conditions elsewhere but also fuel 
aspirations among the less fortunate. Mobility has 
largely been equated with pursuit of greater opportu-
nities and better living conditions for oneself and one’s 
social clans. Unfortunately access to good living and 
job opportunities are not evenly distributed. Those 
with aspiration and self-determination will travel to 
places of greater possibilities. These mobility-aspirants 
are not easily deterred or suppressed. 
cilitators (see Ayalew, this volume), and learning 
through failed journeys which smugglers are worthy 
of trust (see Lucht, this volume). Migrant smuggling 
is a complex and layered social process where kinship, 
friends and associates, overseas migrant communities, 
personal connections, money, and prior experiences 
combine to form the basis for protection, safety, and 
decision-making along the journey. The rise of migrant 
smuggling as an underground travel service is nothing 
but a market solution to officially erected barriers. In 
this “illicit” market space, mutual vetting by buyers and 
sellers takes place, and sufficient trust must exist, at 
least superficially, before a transaction can occur. The 
binary predator-victim perspective rarely applies in a 
context where both migrants and smugglers actively 
engage in negotiating, vetting, and trading. Research-
ers have found similar patterns in which smuggling 
merely presents an opportunity to sell or exchange 
one’s resources (see Zhang 2007, 2008; Chin 1999, and 
Sanchez 2016).  
Many field researchers on irregular migration consider 
the predator-victim binary a narrow portrayal of 
complex cooperation and mutually beneficial interac-
tions because both smuggling facilitators and migrants 
are frequently found to be members of the same social 
networks (e.g., relatives, friends, associates, or social 
acquaintances), thus “committing” crimes of solidar-
ity by providing mutual aid in advancing one another’s 
respective agenda for mobility. By the same token, they 
are subjected to the same informal control processes 
and therefore tend to engage in transactions in ways 
similar to other social enterprises. Smuggling facilita-
tors may break away from commonly accepted social 
mores and codes of conduct for profit and self-preser-
vation, especially in the face of hostile social settings. 
Some may abandon their clients in the deserts or 
charge ransom-like fees. Yet the majority of their op-
erations proceed uneventfully, with little fanfare.
Solidarity features prominently not only in migrants’ 
journeys but also in their adaptation strategies in transit 
communities. Although most migration journeys 
proceed uneventfully, some smuggling operations do 
end in failures. Such failures can lead to many outcomes, 
some disastrous, while others are prolonged. In most 
cases, smugglers attempt to re-smuggle the migrants 
if they want to be paid or remain in business. The fi-
nanciers or whoever fronted the cost of the smuggling 
operation must then decide if they can afford repeated 
failures or abandon migrants in transit countries. 
Secondly, when smuggling operations fail, migrants 
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Towards a Harm-Reduction 
Policy on Irregular 
Migration
One may argue that it is rather Orwellian to suggest 
that since the nation-state creates perilous migration 
conditions it then must tear down the control regime to 
allow a free flow of people. Few believe this is possible. 
Even those who advocate for the rights of migrants 
from the global north are not ready to open their doors 
to the economically unwanted. But may I ask: why 
not? Why not imagine a future where the mobility of 
humans can be compatible with the mobility of goods 
and services? For those who are in favour of building 
walls and digging moats, what are our moral grounds 
for enforcing an apartheid to shut out the economically 
underprivileged, while advocating a borderless global 
economy and touting the virtues of the free trade of 
goods and services? 
Instead of resorting to more knee-jerk response strate-
gies on irregular migration, perhaps it is time we start 
an honest conversation that exposes the real cause 
of irregular migration and the human miseries that 
goes along with it, acknowledges the futile efforts to 
intercept migrants aspiring to mobility, and contrib-
utes to an evidenced-based foundation for rational and 
realistic policies that focus on harm reduction while 
protecting the dignity of those swept up in migration 
flows worldwide. A world without borders is not only 
possible, but inevitable. Time will tell. 
However, the existing political system of the nation-
state and the securitization of borders presents a 
serious obstacle to these migrants. In the age of capi-
talist globalization, movement control rarely applies 
to the rich and wealthy. Barring temporary diplomatic 
flare-ups between nations, capitalist elites are rarely 
concerned with border restrictions. Mobility for them 
means investing their money anywhere in the world or 
producing and selling goods and services wherever the 
highest margins of profit can be achieved.  
While researchers seek to understand how individual 
and collective strategies towards mobility adapt and 
adjust under the increasing militarization of border 
control, one must question why so many are willing to 
risk their lives to migrate. Wouldn’t it be nice if they 
could all just walk up to a check-in counter at an airport, 
hand over their identification papers, and request that 
the boarding pass be printed? Although not all want to 
migrate, many do for various reasons, from escaping 
armed conflicts or man-made calamities to looking for 
better economic opportunities. For those who have the 
misfortune of being born into underprivileged circum-
stances in the global south, mobility often requires al-
ternatives to conventional travel arrangements. 
As Spener (2009) argues, human migration from open 
to clandestine and from legal to illicit is not a mere re-
flection of migrants’ preferences in travel but rather the 
manifestation of the obstacles created not by criminal 
networks but by governments striving to keep out 
those they consider undesirable. Migrant smuggling 
via maritime, overland, and air demonstrates the col-
lective desire and response strategies to circumvent 
these obstacles. To Spener, irregular migration is a 
form of resistance by people seeking to improve their 
life or to escape wars and conflicts, a universal desire 
that is often reserved for the privileged in a world in-
creasingly impacted by economic apartheid (2009). 
Recent geopolitical developments provide ample 
evidence that legal access to desired destinations will 
remain the purview of a privileged few (Gallagher 
2015). As border control regimes rush to erect more 
barriers, people aspiring to mobility will continue to 
rely on their communities and kinship networks to 
find ways to migrate.
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